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GROUNDING DRONES: BIG BROTHER’S TOOL BOX NEEDS 




Cite as: Melanie Reid, Grounding Drones: Big Brother's Tool Box Needs 
Regulation Not Elimination, 20 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 9 (2014), 
http://jolt.richmond.edu/v20i3/article9.pdf. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
[1] The Ford Model A was advertised as “the latest and best” in the 
world1 in 1903 and sparked global interest to design and create better, 
faster, and more complex machines than had ever traveled on land.  Fast 
forward to the 21st century and creating machines that can travel around 
the world’s airspace appears to be the latest fascination.  Until relatively 
recently, only airplanes and helicopters dominated the friendly skies.  But 
now, the public is catching on to the idea that building an aircraft is easier 
that one might expect.  In fact, a pilot is no longer necessary.  Drones, also 
referred to as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or remotely piloted 
aircraft (RPA), can fly without a human operator.2  Chris Anderson, a self-
declared “drone evangelist,” confirmed that: 
                                                              
* Associate Professor of Law, Lincoln Memorial University-Duncan School of Law.  I 
would like to thank Chris Poulopoulos, Pat Laflin, Katherine Marsh, and Bob Reid for 
their invaluable assistance on this article. 
 
1 FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Vehicle History: The First Model A Laid a Foundation for the 
Future, http://corporate.ford.com/our-company/heritage/vehicle-history-news-detail/670-
model-a-1903 (last visited Mar.4, 2014). 
 
2 DAVID GOLDBERG ET AL., UNIV. OF OXFORD REUTERS INSTI. FOR THE STUDY OF 
JOURNALISM, REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS & JOURNALISM: OPPORTUNITIES 
AND CHALLENGES OF DRONES IN NEWS GATHERING 4 (2013).  
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“Thanks to Smartphones, and Wii controllers and other 
consumer electronics, we have all the necessary elements to 
create a Drone.  Sensors, wireless, GPS, processors, 
cameras, everything that’s the Smartphone revolution has 
basically made the technologies cheap and available and 
this has just happened over the past four or five years.”3 
 
Domestic drones designed for private use are the new phenomenon—a 14 
billion dollar industry with trade shows popping up every month and more 
and more manufacturers getting on board as they await the green light 
from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to begin full scale drone 
flights throughout the United States.4  As one UAV manufacturer put it, 
“If the job is too dull, dirty, or dangerous—get a UAV to do it.”5 
                                                              
3 Id. at 2-3.  Chris Anderson is the former editor of Wired magazine and founded 3D 
Robotics, a company that sells drones that can fly for 15 to 20 minutes with HD cameras 
attached.  See Michael S. Rosenwald, A Drone of Your Very Own: These Aren’t Your 




4 See Alistair Barr & Elizabeth Weise, Underground Drone Economy Takes Flight, USA 
TODAY (Dec. 2, 2013, 9:37 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2013/12/02/underground-drone-economy/3805387. 
 
5 GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 2, at 1.  Drones perform missions that previously  
 
fell into three distinct categories: dull, dirty, and dangerous.  Dull 
meant long flights during which pilots faced fatigue flying to remote 
areas of the globe.  Dirty included situations where nuclear weapons or 
biological weapons might be involved.  Dangerous meant missions 
over denied territories such as the Soviet Union, North Korea, and 
China, where shoot-downs were a political risk.   
 
ANNIE JACOBSEN, AREA 51: AN UNCENSORED HISTORY OF AMERICA’S TOP SECRET 
MILITARY BASE 218 (2011). 
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[2] Domestic drones have also caught the eye of local, state, and 
federal law enforcement.  Surveillance, an investigative tool that can 
oftentimes prove to be a “dull, dirty, or dangerous” job, could be easily 
supplemented with drones in the sky.6  Drones could assist law 
enforcement as cost-effective eyes in the sky during undercover or 
informant operations, during search warrant executions, while monitoring 
potentially violent suspects, or while viewing suspected marijuana grows.  
However, state and federal legislators are seemingly shutting down this 
possibility before it gets off the ground. 
 
[3] Unlike other technological advances that, in the past, have seemed 
to sneak up on legislators after courts have ruled on their constitutionality, 
drone legislation has become the new craze.  Twelve states have already 
passed legislation that significantly limits government drone flights, and 
twenty-one states have legislation pending on the matter.7  Perhaps 
legislators have scenes of deadly drone strikes in Yemen or Afghanistan in 
their minds, or they recently watched the latest science fiction movie in 
which a drone-like machine relentlessly pursues the movie’s hero 
throughout the city streets and scanned his retina to identify him.8  Or                                                              
6 See JACOBSEN, supra note 5, at 218. 
 
7 See infra Tables 1-5; see also Allie Bohm, Status of 2014 Domestic Drone Legislation 
in the States, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-
liberty/status-2014-domestic-drone-legislation-states (last updated June 6, 2014) 
[hereinafter 2014 Status of Domestic Drone Legislation]; Allie Bohm, Status of Domestic 
Drone Legislation in the States, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, 
https://www.aclu.org/print/blog/technology-and-liberty/status-domestic-drone-
legislation-states (last updated Jan. 22, 2014) [hereinafter 2013 Status of Domestic Drone 
Legislation].  An additional twelve states have drone legislation regarding law 
enforcement use that is either dead, tabled, or recommended for further study.  Id.  Three 
states, Alaska, Indiana, and Nevada, passed laws relating to drones that does not relate to 
law enforcement use.  Id. 
 
8 See MINORITY REPORT (Twentieth Century Fox 2002). See generally THE BOURNE 
LEGACY (Universal Pictures 2012) (in THE BOURNE LEGACY, armed drones were used to 
assassinate government operators and destroy buildings). 
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perhaps they are concerned that these drones will become self-aware and 
turn into HAL in the movie 2001: A Space Odyssey.9  Whatever the case 
may be, drones and their potential uses have captured the public’s 
attention in a way few other technologically advanced tools have.   
 
[4] With the expected rise in drone use in the next several years, 
Congress appears to have two concerns: safety and privacy.  Congress 
passed its safety concerns onto the FAA with the passage of the FAA 
Modernization and Reform Act of 2012.10  The FAA has been assigned 
the task to create regulations for government and civilian drone use by 
September 2015.11  These regulations, Congress hopes, will alleviate any 
safety concerns surrounding drone flights.  As to privacy, the federal 
government has yet to pass legislation arising from privacy concerns with 
the increase in drone use by civilians and government actors alike; 
however, several bills are being considered.  The Preserving American 
Privacy Act of 2013 would effectively require a warrant before a drone 
could be used.12  As mentioned, several states have already tackled the 
privacy implications of government drone use head-on. 
 
[5] These safety and privacy concerns will lead to regulations for two 
types of drone users: government actors or law enforcement, and civilians.  
The Supreme Court has yet to rule on the use of drones by government                                                              
9 See 2001: A SPACE ODYSSEY (Metro-Goldwyn Mayer 1968).  As drone researchers 
have stated, “if only we could be so lucky.”  Motherboard, Drone On: the Future of UAV 
Over the U.S., YOUTUBE (Dec. 5, 2012), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kwkxx84wXNo. 
 
10 Pub. L. 112-95, 126 Stat. 11 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.). 
 
11 See Bart Jansen, FAA Has Plan for Drones, but Is Behind Schedule, USA TODAY (Dec. 
2, 2013, 11:03 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/travel/flights/2013/12/02/faa-
drones/3805447. 
 
12 See Preserving American Privacy Act of 2013, H.R. 637, 113th Cong. § 3119(c) 
(2013). 
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actors or private civilians and whether it would constitute a “search” under 
the Fourth Amendment with respect to law enforcement use, or a trespass 
or invasion of privacy with respect to private actors.13  With the influx of 
state regulations and increased usage by both government and civilian 
actors, the Supreme Court will undoubtedly face this issue in the near 
future. 
 
[6] This article explores the constitutionality of drone use by law 
enforcement, and questions legislative findings that law enforcement’s use 
of drones is a “search” under the Fourth Amendment.  State legislators 
appear to be concerned that drone flights constitute a trespass or violate 
one’s reasonable expectation of privacy.  Part II of this article examines 
current and future drone usage and the technological abilities it may have 
in the future.  Part III discusses safety concerns associated with drones and 
what the FAA plans to do to keep the airspace of the United States safe.  
Part IV examines privacy concerns related to increased drone usage, and 
the mechanisms being put in place to regulate civilian and government 
operators and prevent significant intrusion into privacy and governmental 
abuse.  In Part V, I argue that not only are legislators mistaken in believing 
drone use falls under Fourth Amendment protections and should require a 
warrant, but that the current analysis used to identify what types of 
government investigatory tools constitute a “search” is no longer effective 
as the global community is experiencing a diminished expectation of 
privacy of its own doing.  Less emphasis should be placed on whether a 
suspect has a reasonable expectation of privacy and more emphasis should 
be placed on whether it would be reasonable for law enforcement to utilize 
a particular investigatory tool without a warrant.  The greater the intrusion 
into a suspect’s private life, house, papers, and effects, the greater the 
chance the Fourth Amendment is triggered and the requisite probable 
cause and warrant necessary.  Lastly, in Part VI, I argue that instead of 
requiring probable cause and the requisite warrant, law enforcement 
should seek a court order similar to the pen register statute under 18 
U.S.C. § 2703.  Law enforcement would be permitted to use drones if the                                                              
13 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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data to be collected is relevant to an ongoing investigation, they 
demonstrate a particularized need to collect the information via drone, and 
if the irrelevant data collected after the flight is subsequently destroyed 
and not stored for future use.   
 
II.  CURRENT AND FUTURE DRONE USE 
 
[7] One of the reasons why domestic drones have become so popular 
is because they serve a variety of purposes for a variety of people.  Drones 
are being used to inspect pipelines, survey and monitor crops,14 monitor 
storm damage and flooding,15 monitor wildlife populations and track 
poachers,16 count sea lions in Alaska, monitor drug trafficking between 
the United States and Mexico borders, monitor high crime neighborhoods 
during drug investigations, monitor traffic, monitor farms for cruelty to 
animals, assist realtors in marketing real estate, and conduct weather and 
environmental research.17  Drones not only assist Hollywood film makers 
find cost effective ways to film scenes18 but also assist first responders in                                                              
14 A $300 UAV could replace a $1,000 per hour manned aircraft to check for disease and 
irrigation levels.  Lucas Eaves, 6 Arguments in Favor of the Commercial Use of Drones, 
IVN (May 6, 2013), http://ivn.us/2013/05/06/6-arguments-in-favor-of-the-commercial-
use-of-drones.   
 
15 See Airborne Drones Can Assess Storm Damage on Distribution Systems, CE 
UNBOUND (May 9, 2012), http://ceunbound.com/index/webapp-stories-
action/id.914/title.airborne-drones-can-assess-storm-damage-on-distribution-systems.   
 
16 See David Draper, Kenyan Wildlife Officials to Use Drones in War on Poaching, FIELD 
NOTES (Jan. 24, 2014), http://www.fieldandstream.com/blogs/field-
notes/2014/01/wildlife-officials-use-drones-combat-rhino-poaching-kenya.  
 
17 See, e.g., Mark Corcoran, Ex-military Spy Drone to Conduct NASA Climate Tests in 
Australian Airspace, ABC NEWS (Jan. 24, 2014), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-01-
23/us-drone-over-australia/5215598.  
 
18 See Gary Susman, Drones and the Future of Movies, ROLLING STONE (Oct. 28, 2013, 
2:50 PM), http://www.rollingstone.com/movies/news/drones-and-the-future-of-movies-
20131028. 
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search and rescue missions and during or after natural or man-made 
disasters.19  Drones also assist oil and gas companies to inspect rigs and 
pipelines.20  The Darwin Aerospace laboratory in San Francisco has even 
designed the Burrito Bomber, the world’s first airborne Mexican food 
delivery drone, which would allow customers to have food parachuted to 
their doorsteps.21   
 
[8] Drones come in all shapes and sizes.  The largest drone, to date, is 
the $200 million U.S. Air Force Northrop Grumman RQ-4 Global Hawk, 
which has the wingspan of an airliner.22  A forty-five member ground 
crew services and maintains this drone which can soar to 65,000 feet and 
make non-stop thirty-five hour missions.23  On the other end of the 
spectrum, small, unsophisticated drones can be purchased at the local 
hobby shop or online for the price of a smartphone.24  Cameras can be 
attached to a drone and stream video back to a tablet or smartphone, which 
is operated via a Wi-Fi network generated by the drone.25  One of the 
smallest drones is the Norwegian-developed Black Hornet, which weighs 
sixteen grams and “has an operational radius of more than one kilometre                                                              
19 See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 2, at 5. 
 
20 See Ed Crooks, Conoco in Landmark Alaska Drone Flight, CNBC (Sept. 25, 2013, 
2:09 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/101060663. 
 
21 See Rachel Janik & Mitchell Armentrout, Industry Looks to Use Drones for 
Commercial Purposes, MCCLATCHY DC (April 29, 2013), 
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/04/29/189893/industry-looks-to-use-drones-for.html.  
 
22 GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 2, at 5.    
 
23 Id.  The Global Hawk provided imagery over the California wildfires in 2008, the 
Haitian earthquake in 2010, and the Japanese post-tsunami disaster in 2011.  Id. 
 
24 See id. 
 
25 See id. at 6. 
 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XX, Issue 3  
 
8  
and twenty-five minute endurance.”26  A popular drone is the fixed-wing 
Raven, which has “a duration of 90 minutes, a 10 kilometre operational 
radius, and a maximum ceiling of 14,000 feet.”27  The Raven can be 
equipped with a sophisticated camera system and nighttime infrared 
capabilities; it costs approximately $35,000 dollars.28  The Draganflyer 
drone has a flight time of twenty minutes without payload, which is a 
maximum of eighteen ounces.29  The Predator drone, on the other hand, 
can carry 3,000 pounds and has an operational flight time of twenty-seven 
hours.30    
 
[9] Law enforcement, in particular, has caught on to the drone craze.  
The Miami Police Department in Florida has drones—two Honeywell 
aircraft to fly no higher than 400 feet over the everglades.31  The U.S. 
Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) currently operates ten Predator drones32                                                              
26 Id. at 7. 
 
27 GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 2, at 10 (citing UAS: RQ-11B Raven, AEROVIRONMENT, 
INC., http://www.avinc.com/uas/small_uas/raven (last visited Mar. 5, 2014)). 
 
28 See id.  
 
29 See Questions Many People Ask of Us, DRAGANFLY INNOVATIONS, INC., 
http://www.draganfly.com/question-answers (last visited Mar. 5, 2014); X6 Technical 
Overview, DRAGANFLY INNOVATIONS, INC., http://www.draganfly.com/uav-
helicopter/draganflyer-x6a/specifications (Mar. 5, 2014). 
 
30 Predator® B UAS, GENERAL ATOMICS AERONAUTICAL, http://www.ga-
asi.com/products/aircraft/predator_b.php (last visited Mar. 24, 2014). 
 
31 JAY STANLEY & CATHERINE CRUMP, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, PROTECTING 
PRIVACY FROM AERIAL SURVEILLANCE:  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR GOVERNMENT USE OF 
DRONE AIRCRAFT 7 (2011) (citing Yochi J. Dreazen, From Pakistan, with Love: The 
Technology Used to Monitor the Skies over Waziristan Is Coming to Your Hometown, 
NAT’L J. (Mar. 13, 2011), http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/drones-may-be-
coming-to-your-hometown-20110313). 
  
32 See Craig Whitlock & Craig Timberg, Border-Patrol Drones Being Borrowed by Other 
Agencies More Often than Previously Known, WASH. POST (Jan. 14, 2014), 
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and hopes to expand their number of drones to twenty-four by 2016.33  
CBP drones patrol the southern border, and the Department of Defense has 
sent drones into Mexico to gather information about major drug 
traffickers.34  
 
[10] Two “nanodrones” are currently in production and garnering 
interest.  The hummingbird drone “navigates by changing the angle and 
shape of its paper-thin wings—which beat twenty to forty times per 
second—and can hover in place for up to 11 minutes.”35  “It is also small 
enough to fly through windows or other small openings, strong enough to 
carry a microphone or camera, and stable enough to maintain a highly 
controlled hover, even in gusts of wind.”36  The mosquito drone can be 
remotely controlled and is equipped with a camera and a microphone.37  





33 See STANLEY & CRUMP, supra note 31, at 6 (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, OBSERVATIONS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF AN INCREASED DEPARTMENT OF 
DEFENSE ROLE IN HELPING TO SECURE THE SOUTHWEST LAND BORDER, GAO-11-856R 
(Sept. 12, 2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-856R). 
 
34 See id. at 7 (citing Ginger Thompson & Mark Mazzetti, U.S. Drones Fight Mexican 
Drug Trade, N. Y. TIMES, (Mar. 15, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/16/world/americas/16drug.html). 
 
35 Aerovironment Nano Hummingbird UAV, POPULAR SCIENCE, 
http://www.popsci.com/bown/2011/product/aerovironment-nano-hummingbird-uav (last 
visited Mar. 6, 2014). 
 
36 Id.  
 
37 Robert Johnson, The Future of Micro Drones Could Get Downright Scary, BUS. 
INSIDER (June 20, 2012, 11:49 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-future-of-
micro-drones-is-getting-pretty-scary-according-to-alan-lovejoy-2012-6. 
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Once it lands, it can take a DNA sample or leave an RFID38 tracking 
device under the skin.39 
 
[11] Both the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) have used Predator drones inside the 
United States.40  FBI Director Robert Mueller commented to Congress 
that drones were “very seldom used” by his agents but that he was aware 
of at least three drones in FBI possession as of 2011.41  The police 
department in Mesa County, Colorado operates its Draganflyer drones in 
their county.42  Police in Arlington, Texas used drones to assist with 
security during the Super Bowl in February 2011 and also for “’training 
and evaluation’ purposes in unpopulated areas.”43  The Texas Department                                                              
38  
Radio frequency identification, or RFID, is a generic term for 
technologies that use radio waves to automatically identify people or 
objects. There are several methods of identification, but the most 
common is to store a serial number that identifies a person or object, 
and perhaps other information, on a microchip that is attached to an 
antenna (the chip and the antenna together are called an RFID 
transponder or an RFID tag). The antenna enables the chip to transmit 
the identification information to a reader. The reader converts the radio 
waves reflected back from the RFID tag into digital information that 
can then be passed on to computers that can make use of it.   
 
Frequently Asked Questions, RFID J., http://www.rfidjournal.com/site/faqs#Anchor-
What-363 (last visited Mar. 6, 2014). 
 
39 See Johnson, supra note 37.  
 
40 See STANLEY & CRUMP, supra note 31, at 7. 
 
41 Somini Sengupta, U.S. Border Agency Allows Others to Use Its Drones, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 3, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/04/business/us-border-agency-is-a-
frequent-lender-of-its-drones.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 
42 See STANLEY & CRUMP, supra note 31, at 7. 
 
43 Id. at 8. 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XX, Issue 3  
 
11  
of Public Safety used a bird-sized “Wasp” aircraft to conduct aerial 
surveillance during the execution of a search warrant.44  The city of 
Ogden, Utah, sought FAA permission in 2011 to deploy an unmanned 
blimp for surveillance and crime prevention.45  National Guard units 
around the country operate drones to train for their use overseas46 and the 
United States Forest Service has been known to use drones to fly over 
national parks.47    
 
[12] More than 300 drones have been licensed by the FAA to fly over 
U.S. soil.48  The FAA expects that number to increase to 30,000 by 
2020.49  An aerospace consulting firm estimates that the commercial drone 
industry is currently worth $14 billion per year and that drones will soon 
become a $90 billion industry that creates thousands of jobs in the next 
decade.50  The Association of Unmanned Vehicle Systems International                                                              
44 See id. 
 
45 Id.  
 
46 See id.  
 
47 See Brian Skoloff & Tracie Cone, Calif. Launches Drone to Aid Wildfire Battle, 
YAHOO! NEWS (Aug. 28, 2013, 10:04 PM), http://news.yahoo.com/calif-launches-drone-
aid-wildfire-battle-211622327.html (discussing the U.S. Forest Service's use of the 
Predator drone to fight the Rim Fire in Yosemite National Park).   
 
48 See Domestic Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Drones, EPIC.ORG, 
http://epic.org/privacy/drones (last visited Mar. 6, 2014).   
 




50 See Clay Dillow, What Is the Drone Industry Really Worth?, CNN MONEY (Mar. 12, 
2013 2:09 PM), http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2013/03/12/what-is-the-drone-industry-
really-worth; Josh Solomon, Uncertainties Remain as FAA Integrates Drones Into 
American Skies, MCCLATCHY DC (April 29, 2013), 
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/04/29/189894/uncertainties-remain-as-faa-
integrates.html.  For three days in August of 2013, “8,000 attendees from over 40 
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(AUVSI) lobbies on behalf of the drone industry and sponsors conferences 
advertising the technological advances made in drones and their variety of 
uses.51  At one of the latest drone conferences, an insurance company 
advertised themselves as providing "the most comprehensive Drone 
Operator Coverage and Drone Manufacturing Coverage available in the 
market."52 
 
[13] The Pentagon cut spending on military drones from $4.8 billion in 
2012 to $3.8 billion in 2013 with further reductions anticipated.53  
Initially, drones were used by the military as a reconnaissance tool, with 
the D-21 drone making its first reconnaissance mission over China in 
1969.54  In 1995, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) sent drones on 
more than 600 reconnaissance missions in the Bosnian conflict, and the 
drones also provided intelligence for NATO forces in the 1999 Kosovo air                                                                                                                                                        
countries . . . converge[d] on Washington, D.C. for the largest international unmanned 
systems conference where over 600 exhibitors consume[d] more than 350,000 square feet 
of exhibit space.”  Why Exhibit?, AUVSI’S UNMANNED SYSTEMS 2013, 
http://www.auvsishow.org/auvsi13/public/Content.aspx?ID=1202 (last visited Mar. 10, 
2014). 
 
51 See Advocacy, AUVSI, http://www.auvsi.org/advocacy (last visited March 10, 2014).  
 
52 Arin Greenwood, Drone Conference 2013: Unmanned Vehicle Industry Worries Word 
‘Drone’ Has Negative Connotations, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 14, 2013, 10:27 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/14/drone-convention-2013_n_3756641.html. 
 
53 See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 2, at 2.  Drones have been operational since 1946 
when drones were sent through mushroom clouds at Bikini Atoll during nuclear testing in 
order for the government to be able to sample nuclear fallout.  See JACOBSEN, supra note 
5, at 223.  The drone operators flew the drones by remote control from an airborne 
mother ship flying nearby.  See id. 
 
54 See JACOBSEN, supra note 5, at 221.  The drone flew into China and over the Lop Nur 
nuclear facility but then strayed off course into Soviet Siberia, ran out of fuel, and 
crashed.  Id.  The drone was later given back to the CIA by a KGB agent in Moscow as a 
gift.  Id. 
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campaign by “searching for targets” and “keeping an eye on Kosovar-
Albanian refugee camps.”55  In January 2001, the CIA considered 
assassinating Osama bin Laden with the Predator drone, but the Predator 
had only been used for reconnaissance missions.56  This was the first 
occasion that the military considered using drones as a weapon rather than 
as a reconnaissance tool.57  Today, with significant military budget cuts 
looming, drone manufacturers need to find a new market for their 
creations. 
 
[14] Therefore, aerospace manufacturers are looking to create a 
lucrative civilian market.  The chief operating officer of a Los Angeles-
based company that makes operating systems for drones, Denis Clements, 
remarked that the drone industry is transitioning “from all-military on a 
relatively small scale to international and commercial on a large scale."58  
The AUVSI estimates that the industry will be worth $82 billion and 
employ 100,000 people by 2025.59 
 
[15] Law enforcement, in particular, is interested in using drones as 
they are typically smaller than traditional aircraft, less likely to be 
detected, create less noise and vibrations, and less expensive than aircraft 
and helicopters so they can afford to purchase and use more of them.60  Of                                                              
55 Id. at 352.   
 
56 See id. at 350. 
 
57 See id.  The new weaponized drone technology was tested at Area 51.  See id. at 351.  
The Predator can carry 200 pounds of weapons.  See id. at 355. 
 
58 Greenwood, supra note 52. 
 
59 See id.  
 
60 The Falcon UAV can fly at up to 1,500 feet and has a sixty to ninety minute 
operational flight time.  Information, FALCON UAV, http://www.falcon-uav.com/falcon-
uav-info (last visited Mar. 10, 2014).  The Falcon UAV can cost as little as $3.36 per 
hour to operate compared to $250-$600 per hour to operate traditional aircraft.  See 
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course, the cost depends upon the size and sophistication of the drone, and 
law enforcement need also worry about collisions and tort liability if one 
of their drones collides with other aircraft or destroys personal property on 
the ground. 
 
III.  ASSOCIATED SAFETY CONCERNS 
 
[16] Who owns the airspace and who can regulate drone flights?  In 
early English and American common law, courts followed the rule that 
whoever owned the land possessed all the space above the land extending 
upwards into the heavens.61  Much later, Congress changed that tradition 
by passing the Air Commerce Act of 192662 and the Civil Aeronautics Act 
of 1938, 63 which granted the United States complete sovereignty over its 
own airspace.  Then, in 1958, the passage of the Federal Aviation Act64 
gave the new Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) the responsibility to 
set uniform rules for the operation of aircraft in United States airspace.65 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
Darrell Preston, Drones Take to American Skies on Police, Search Missions, BLOOMBERG 
(May 31, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-31/drones-take-to-american-
skies-on-police-search-missions.html. 
 
61 See, e.g., Colin Cahoon, Low Altitude Airspace: A Property Rights No-Man’s Land, 56 
J. AIR L. & COM. 157, 163 (1990).  The ancient Latin law saying was “cujus est solum, 
ejus est usque ad coelum.”  Id. at 162.  “It is ancient doctrine that at common law 
ownership of the land extended to the periphery of the universe—cujus est solum ejus est 
usque ad coelom.  But that doctrine has no place in the modern world.”  United States v. 
Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260-61 (1946) (citation omitted). 
 
62 Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-251, 44 Stat. 568. 
 
63 See Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, 52 Stat. 973. 
 
64 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726; 72 Stat. 731. 
 
65 H.R. REP. NO. 85-2360, at 1 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3741, 3741. 
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[17] According to FAA regulations, fixed-wing aircraft must operate at 
least “1,000 feet above the highest obstacle within a horizontal radius of 
2,000 feet of the aircraft” in congested areas and “500 feet above the 
surface” in non-congested areas.66  A helicopter may fly below the 
minimum safe altitudes prescribed for fixed-wing aircraft if it is operated 
“without hazard to persons or property on the surface.”67  According to a 
1981 FAA advisory circular, recreational users of model aircraft may fly a 
sufficient distance from populated areas and may not fly in the vicinity of 
full scale aircraft, into noise-sensitive areas such as parks, schools, 
hospitals, or churches, or more than 400 feet above the surface.68   
 
[18] Regulations mandating safe minimum operating altitudes have not 
been set forth specifically for drones, and it is unclear whether some 
smaller drones may fall under the 1981 advisory circular for model 
aircraft.  By contrast, the United Kingdom  
 
permits private use of RPAS [remotely piloted aircraft] 
under [twenty kilograms] to be flown within line of sight to 
avoid collisions and the operator must maintain constant 
visual contact with the aircraft.  Flights less than 100 feet 
above the ground are nearly free of regulation and those 
between 100 and 400 feet are somewhat free for non-
commercial uses, although all must comply with the basic 
rules of air.  Traditional flight regulations apply to all 
aircraft over [twenty kilograms].69                                                              
66 14 C.F.R. § 91.119(b), (c) (2013). 
 
67 14 C.F.R. § 91.119(d) (2013). 
 
68 FED. AVIATION ADMIN., ADVISORY CIRCULAR 91-57 (1981), available at 
http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/91-57.pdf; see 72 Fed. 
Reg. 6,689, 6,690 (Feb. 13, 2007).  The guidelines are voluntary compared to FAA 
regulations.  See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra. 
 
69 GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 2, at 14.  
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[19] With an increase in drone usage, the biggest safety concern is the 
probability of mid-air collisions.  Another concern is drone malfunctions 
and subsequent crashes due to third parties interfering with signals sent to 
the drone, causing the operator to lose control of the aircraft.  Drones 
require satellites (and satellite links) to relay information to and from the 
pilots who operate the drones via remote control; a drone need only be in 
line of sight with its ground control station when it lands, the rest is done 
via satellite link.70  A third party could jam communications or target the 
drone’s GPS link and manipulate its flight position.71  In December 2011, 
Iran alleged that it was able to hack into a U.S. government drone’s GPS 
navigational controls as it was flying back to its base in Afghanistan and 
had it safely land in Iran where Iranian engineers were then able to design 
their own drones based off the U.S. model.72 
 
[20] A number of domestic drone accidents have already been reported.  
Drones experience an accident rate over seven times higher than general 
aviation and 353 times higher than in commercial aviation.73  
 
[21] Private property owners have the ability to sue the government for 
any damage done to their property by government-operated drones via the 
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, which states that private property may 
not “be taken for public use, without just compensation.”74  The property                                                              
70 See JACOBSEN, supra note 5, at 358.   
 
71 See Solomon, supra note 50.  
 
72 See Marcus George, Iran Military Says Copying U.S. Drone, REUTERS (Apr. 22, 2012), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/22/us-iran-military-drone-
idUSBRE83L02I20120422; Adam Rawnsley, Iran’s Alleged Drone Hack: Tough, but 
Possible, WIRED (Dec. 16, 2011, 6:01 PM), 
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/12/iran-drone-hack-gps.   
 
73 See STANLEY & CRUMP, supra note 31, at 10 (citations omitted). 
 
74 U.S. CONST. amend. V.  
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owners must allege that the drone flight directly and immediately 
interfered with their use and enjoyment of their surface land.75  To allege 
an actionable trespass against non-government actors (who are immune 
from the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause), a landowner has various 
causes of actions in tort to consider, such as trespass and nuisance, and 
may argue that the interference by the drone occurred within the 
immediate reaches of the land or with the actual use of his land.76   
 
[22] To address the public’s security concerns, Congress passed the 
FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 201277 which requires the FAA to 
“develop a comprehensive plan to safely accelerate the integration of civil 
unmanned aircraft systems into the national airspace system”78 by 
September 30, 2015.79  Lawmakers were concerned about drone safety 
and uniformity throughout the national airspace.  Specific provisions in 
the “Drone Act” authorize law enforcement and other government 
agencies to use drones while the FAA is crafting its regulations for 
commercial use and also mandates that the drones must weigh twenty-five 
pounds or less, cannot be operated higher than 400 feet above the ground 
                                                             
75 Id.; see United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 262 (1946). 
 
76 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159(2) (1965) (“Flight by aircraft in the 
air space above the land of another is a trespass if, but only if, (a) it enters into the 
immediate reaches of the air space next to the land, and (b) it interferes substantially with 
the other’s use and enjoyment of his land”). 
 
77 FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95 § 332(a)(1), 126 
Stat. 11, 73 (2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.). 
 
78 Id.  The FAA’s plan must include recommendations or projections on how the 
rulemaking will address the certification process for drones; drone sense and avoid 
capabilities; and establishing operator or pilot standards, including a licensing and 
registration system.  See § 332(a)(2)(1)(A). 
 
79 § 332(a)(3).  The law was signed by the President on February 14, 2012. 
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or near airports and must remain within the naked eyesight of the 
operator.80   
 
[23] Currently, any federal, state, or local agency wanting to operate a 
drone in national airspace needs a certificate of authorization from the 
FAA.81  The FAA conducts an operational and technical review of the 
drone in order to ensure citizens’ safety when the drone is in use in 
national airspace.82  Private commercial operators must receive a special 
airworthiness certificate in order to operate a drone.83 
 
[24] While drafting new regulations, the FAA is also creating a series of 
test ranges and designating specific airspace throughout the country to be 
used to operate drone flights in order to develop better certification and air 
traffic standards.84  These test flights will assist the FAA in learning more 
about the safe operation of drones while traveling in navigable U.S. 
airspace.85  Twenty-five applicants from twenty-four states applied to be 
test sites and of those twenty-five applicants, the FAA chose Alaska, 
Nevada, New York, North Dakota, Texas, and Virginia to host drone test 
sites.86                                                              
80 See Solomon, supra note 50. 
 
81  See Unmanned Aircraft Operations in the National Airspace System, 72 Fed. Reg. 
6689-01 (Feb. 13, 2007) (codified at 14 C.F.R pt. 91). 
 
82 See Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Certificates and Authorizations, FAA, 
http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/uas/cert (last modified Mar. 19, 2013, 10:56 AM). 
 
83  See 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.191, 21.193 (2013); Unmanned Aircraft Operations in the 
National Airspace System, 72 Fed. Reg. at 6689-90. 
 
84 FAA Modernization and Reform Act § 332(c). 
 
85 FAA Selects Unmanned Aircraft Systems Research and Test Sites, FAA (Dec. 30, 
2013), http://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/news_story.cfm?newsid=15576. 
 
86 Those states that applied to be test sites include: New York, Michigan, Ohio, 
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Minnesota, 
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IV.  ASSOCIATED PRIVACY CONCERNS 
 
A.  State Legislation 
 
[25] Forty-five states have introduced legislation to protect privacy and 
limit drone use.87  These states seem to be singularly focused on law 
enforcement’s use of drones and are not overly concerned about the 
privacy ramifications as drone use increases for private, commercial and 
recreational purposes.  Most of the proposed state legislation allows 
private citizens to bring a civil action against a government agency which 
uses a drone against them but does not place any restrictions on other 
private citizens who might use a drone for similar surveillance purposes.88  
Many of the bills are currently pending; twelve bills have died, been 
vetoed, or are pending for further study; twelve bills have passed and 
become law.89  Additionally, Indiana has passed a resolution calling for 
the creation of a committee to study the use of drones,90 and Alaska has                                                                                                                                                        
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, Colorado, Utah, Arizona, Nevada, California, Idaho, 
Wyoming, Washington, and Alaska.  See Map Showing State Distribution of UAS Test 
Site Proposals Across the Nation, FAA, 
http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/uas/media/UAS_testsite_map.pdf (last visited Mar. 
10, 2014); see also FAA Selects Six Sites for Unmanned Aircraft Research, FAA, 
http://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=75399 (last modified Dec. 30, 2013). 
 
87 See infra Tables 1-5; 2014 Status of Domestic Drone Legislation, supra note 7; 2013 
Status of Domestic Drone Legislation, supra note 7. 
 
88 See infra Tables 1-5.  Only Idaho, Rhode Island, and Texas create a civil cause of 
action against private citizens, and only Michigan, New Hampshire, New York, and 
Texas have created criminal penalties for the authorized use of drone for surveillance.  Id.  
 
89 See infra Tables 1-5; 2014 Status of Domestic Drone Legislation, supra note 7; 2013 
Status of Domestic Drone Legislation, supra note 7.  States that have passed legislation 
include:  Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Montana, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, 
Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
 
90 S. Res. 27, 118th Gen. Assemb. 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2013). 
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passed a resolution to create a task force to assist the FAA in creating a 
safe place for the testing of drones and the development of adequate safety 
procedures for future drone use.91 
 
[26] Perhaps states are relying upon the common law torts of trespass, 
nuisance, invasion of privacy, stalking, and harassment to keep personal 
abuse in check.  An individual who alleges another private individual has 
invaded his privacy through the use of a drone must prove that the 
defendant intruded, physically or otherwise, upon the plaintiff’s solitude 
or seclusion or his private affairs or concerns and “the intrusion would be 
highly offensive to a reasonable person.”92  A plaintiff’s nuisance claim 
would be based upon the right to use and enjoy land—it is not necessary to 
show that the interference by the drone actually occupied the owner’s land 
(it could fly over adjoining lands only) so long as the flight substantially 
and unreasonably interfered with the use and enjoyment of the land.93 
 
[27] While personal drone operators are left to their own devices, 
legislatures have given law enforcement strict guidelines.94  The overall 
trend of the state laws is to make the use of drones more restrictive than 
what the Supreme Court currently requires for aerial surveillance.  States 
deem themselves proactive by adopting legislation to limit drone flights 
and make the use of drones by law enforcement fall under requirements as 
if the Fourth Amendment applied to their actions.  Most of the current or 
pending state laws do not allow the use of drones without some type of 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause.95                                                              
91 H.R. Con. Res. 6, 28th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Alaska 2013). 
 
92 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). 
 
93 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159(2) (1965). 
 
94 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-609 (2013) (requiring that law enforcement first 
obtain a warrant prior to using a drone or use a drone pursuant to narrowly defined 
exceptions to the statutory warrant requirement). 
 
95 See generally infra Tables 1-5. 
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[28] For example, Florida signed into law the Freedom from 
Unwarranted Surveillance Act, effective July 1, 2013.96  The new Florida 
law bans local law enforcement from using drones unless they have a 
warrant or there is a credible threat of a terrorist attack or if reasonable 
suspicion exists to indicate “swift action is needed to prevent imminent 
danger to life or serious damage to property” or “to forestall the imminent 
escape of a suspect or the destruction of evidence, or to achieve purposes 
including, but not limited to, facilitating the search for a missing 
person.”97  The Florida law prohibits the use of information collected by 
drones in violation of the act being used as evidence in courts.98   
 
[29] Idaho requires law enforcement to seek a warrant to use a drone to 
gather evidence unless exigent circumstances exist or the agent possesses 
reasonable suspicion that, under particular circumstances, swift action to 
prevent danger to life is necessary.99 
 
[30] Illinois requires law enforcement to seek a warrant except if the 
drone will be used to prevent a terrorist attack, prevent death or serious 
bodily injury, prevent escape of a suspect, or to protect evidence.100  Law 
enforcement must destroy all information obtained by the drone within 
thirty days unless there is a pending investigation or trial, and agencies are 
required to report to legislators annually on drone usage.101 
                                                              






99 See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 21-213 (2013). 
 
100 Freedom from Drone Surveillance Act, 2013 Ill. Legis. Serv. 98-569 § 15 (West) 
(codified at 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 167/§15). 
 
101 Id. at §§ 20, 35. 
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[31] Montana also requires a warrant or a recognized exception to the 
warrant requirement in order for law enforcement to use a drone.102  
Information obtained from a drone outside the warrant process may not be 
used in an affidavit for probable cause in an effort to obtain a search or 
arrest warrant unless the information was obtained through monitoring 
public lands or international borders.103  
 
[32] Oregon requires a warrant for drones unless there is a reasonable 
belief that there is a threat of bodily harm or death and an affidavit is filed 
within forty-eight hours of the drone use.104  A warrant is not required if 
the drone is used to reconstruct a crime scene, for search and rescue 
operations, or during a declared state of emergency for public safety 
purposes only.105  Drones may not be weaponized.106 
 
[33] Tennessee requires that “no law enforcement agency shall use a 
drone to gather evidence or other information” except in the event of a 
terrorist risk or attack, the existence of a warrant, reasonable suspicion to 
prevent an imminent danger to life, or if law enforcement is searching for 
a fugitive or monitoring a hostage, or missing person.107  No data collected 
from the drone may be used, copied, or disclosed.108  Any data must be 
deleted within twenty-four hours after collection.109                                                              




104 OR. REV. STAT. § 837.335 (2013 Supp.). 
 
105 § 837.340. 
 
106 See § 837.365. 
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[34] Texas outlaws drone use unless it falls under one of several 
exceptions.110  Law enforcement in particular may use drones “pursuant to 
a valid search or arrest warrant;” if law enforcement is “in immediate 
pursuit of a person law enforcement officers have reasonable suspicion or 
probable cause to suspect has committed an offense;” “for the purpose of 
documenting a crime scene;” “for the purpose of investigating the scene of 
[] a human fatality; [] a motor vehicle accident causing death or serious 
bodily injury to a person;” “in connection with the search for a missing 
person;” or “for the purpose of conducting a high-risk tactical operation 
that poses a threat to human life.”111 
 
[35] Virginia is the most restrictive state and does not allow for a 
warrant to grant the use of drones.112  However, drones can be used for 
Amber Alerts, Senior Alerts,113 Blue Alerts,114 search or rescue 
operations, or training exercises.115 
 
[36] Idaho and Texas are unique in that they have passed bills that 
regulate drone surveillance by public and private parties.  The Texas 
legislation provides at least nineteen circumstances when drone use is 
permitted, for example, by real estate brokers “in connection with the 
marketing, sale or financing of real property,” oil and gas companies for 
“inspecting, maintaining, or repairing pipelines,” and utility companies for                                                              




112 H.R. 2012, 2013 Sess. (Va. 2013). 
 
113 A Senior Alert is a message sent to the public when a senior adult is reported missing.  
See VA. CODE ANN. § 52-34.6 (2013 Supp.). 
 
114 Blue Alert is a message sent to the public in the event that either a dangerous suspect 
or convict has escaped police custody or that a law enforcement officer is missing under 
circumstances that raise concern for the officer’s safety.  See § 52-34.9. 
 
115 H.R. 2012. 
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“assessing vegetation growth for the purpose of maintaining clearances on 
utility easements.”116 
 
[37] Legislation is currently pending in: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, 
California, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, 
Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Vermont, and West Virginia.117 
 
[38] The following states’ bills are very similar to the legislation 
already passed in the states previously mentioned.  Alabama’s bill, S.B. 
317, the Freedom from Drone Surveillance Act, is indefinitely postponed 
in the Senate.118  Arizona’s bill, H.B. 2574, passed the house committee, 
but is not law.119  Arizona’s bill would require a search warrant before law 
enforcement could use a drone to “gather, store or collect evidence of any 
type, including audio or video recordings,” and the search warrant must 
include the citizen’s name.120  The bill makes an exception if the drone 
was used to enforce state drug or smuggling laws on public land or on 
private land with the consent of the landowner.121  A citizen could 
lawfully own and operate a drone but could not use it to “monitor other                                                              
116 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 423.002 (West 2013); see also Timothy B. Lee, Can State 
Laws Protect You from Being Watched by Drones?, WASH. POST, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/06/18/can-state-laws-protect-
you-from-being-watched-by-drones (last updated June 18, 2013). 
 
117 See infra Tables 1-5. 
 
118 See History for SB317, 
http://alisondb.legislature.state.al.us/acas/ACTIONHistoryResultsMac.asp?OID=80688&
LABEL=SB317 (last visited Mar. 24, 2014) (Alison, Alabama Legislative Information 
System Online). 
 




121 See id. 
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persons inside their homes or places of worship or within the closed 
confines of their property or other locations where a person would have an 
expectation of privacy.”122 
 
[39] Arkansas House Bill 1904 would make it unlawful for law 
enforcement to operate a drone unless they have consent, a search warrant, 
an emergency situation (immediate danger or serious bodily injury), or 
conspiratorial activities threatening national security or organized 
crime.123 
 
[40] California’s bill, S.B. 15, is currently in committee and requires a 
search warrant unless there is an exception to the search warrant such as 
exigent circumstances.124  Georgia S.B. 200 would require a warrant for 
government drone use unless exigent circumstances exist.125  
 
[41] Maine’s bill passed both chambers but was vetoed by the 
Governor, and the veto was sustained.126  The legislation would have 
required either a warrant or an emergency situation, with a sworn 
statement explaining the emergency filed with the court no later than 
forty-eight hours after the drone flight.127  The information collected by 
                                                             
122 Id. 
 
123 H.B. 1904, 89th Gen. Assemb., 2013 Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013). 
 
124 S.B. 15, 2013-2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013).  
 
125 S.B. 200, 152nd Gen. Ass., 2013-2014 Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2013). 
 
126 See Summary of LD 236, ST. ME LEGIS., 
www.mainelegislature.org/LAWMAKERWEB/summary.asp?ID=280046602 (last 
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the drone needed to be destroyed after forty-eight hours unless an 
investigation or trial was pending.128 
 
[42] The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) was quick to weigh 
in on the privacy discussion and recommended that drones deploy only 
with a warrant, in an emergency, or when specific and articulable grounds 
to believe that the drone will collect evidence relating to a specific 
criminal act exist.129  Law enforcement should only retain images when 
there is reasonable suspicion that they contain evidence of a crime or are 
relevant to an ongoing investigation or trial.130  The ACLU argues that the 
usage policy of drones should be decided democratically rather than by 
police departments, and that policies are clear, written, and open to the 
public.131  Moreover, they insist that the use of drones be subject to open 
audits and proper oversight to prevent misuse.132 
 
B.  Federal Legislation 
 
[43] On the federal level, Rep. Ted Poe (R-Tex.) of the Subcommittee 
on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security introduced the Preserving 
American Privacy Act of 2013,133 which would prohibit drone use by law 
                                                             
128 Id.  The bill would have permitted courts to extend the order up to thirty days where a 
court determined it was necessary to achieve the purposes for which the order was 
granted.  Id. 
 
129 See STANLEY & CRUMP, supra note 31, at 15. 
 
130 See id. at 16. 
 
131 See id. 
 
132 See id. 
 
133 See Preserving American Privacy Act of 2013, H.R. 637, 113th Cong. (2013);  see 
also Marshall Cohen, Push in Congress to Protect Privacy Amid Growth in Drone Use,  
MCCLATCHYDC (Apr. 29, 2013) http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/04/29/189895/push-
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enforcement outside the parameters of the legislation and protects private 
citizens against certain “covered information” collected by drones.134  The 
Act defines “covered information” as “information that is reasonably 
likely to enable identification of an individual; or [] information about an 
individual’s property that is not in plain view.”135  Law enforcement may 
operate a drone and collect “covered information” pursuant to a warrant 
based upon probable cause.136  No later than ten days after the execution 
of the warrant, the governmental entity that sought the warrant must 
“serve a copy of the warrant on each person on whom covered information 
was collected, except, if providing such notice would seriously jeopardize 
an ongoing criminal or national security investigation, the court may delay 
such notice on request of the governmental entity.”137   
 
[44] Under the Act, if law enforcement wishes to operate a drone in a 
“stipulated public area,” they may seek a court order based upon a 
showing of “a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and a reasonable 
probability that the operation of a public unmanned aircraft system will 
                                                                                                                                                       
in-congress-to-protect-privacy.html (noting that the AUVSI drone lobby spent $60,000 
lobbying against the bill in 2012).   
 
134 H.R. 637 §§ 3119a(2)(a)(b), 3119b(a); see also Protecting the 4th Amendment, TED 
POE: U.S. CONGRESSMAN 2ND DISTRICT OF TEXAS (Jan. 3, 2014, 12:12 PM) 
http://poe.house.gov/key-issue-rationale/protecting-the-4th-amendment/ (noting that on 
April 8, 2013, the Act “was referred to the House Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, 
Homeland Security, and Investigations” and that “[a] subject matter hearing was also 
held in this subcommittee.”). 
 
135 H.R. 637, § 3119a(2)(A), (B).  It is unclear whether the legislators mean plain view 
from the air or within plain view at ground level.  The definition of “covered 
information” appears to cover anything seen during aerial surveillance. 
 
136 See id. at § 3119c(c)(1)(A). 
 
137 Id. at § 3119c(c)(1)(B). 
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provide evidence of such criminal activity.”138  The court order may only 
authorize the operation of the drone “in a stipulated public area for a 
period of not more than [forty-eight] hours”139 “which may be renewed at 
the court’s discretion for a total period of operation of not longer than 
[thirty] days.”140  Ten days after the termination of the court order, law 
enforcement must “serve a copy on each person on whom covered 
information was collected”141 or not less than forty-eight hours prior to 
such operation, law enforcement must notify the public in the stipulated 
public area, of such operation “in a major publication (with circulation of 
more than 1,000 in that area); [] on a public Internet Web site of the 
governmental entity, for the duration of the operation; or [] on public 
signage in the area, for the duration of the operation.”142 
 
[45] There are limited exceptions to the warrant requirement.  Law 
enforcement may use drones outside the warrant requirement if “[t]he 
operation is within a distance of [twenty-five] miles from any external 
land boundary of the United States and is for the purpose of patrolling or                                                              
138 Id. at § 3119c(c)(2)(A).  The ACLU has interpreted the Act to mean that police are 
required “to get a warrant based on probable cause before launching a drone to search a 
non-public area” and reasonable suspicion to search a public area.  See Sandra Fulton, 
Experts Discuss Surveillance at Domestic Drones Hearing, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION 
(May. 17, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty-national-
security/experts-discuss-surveillance-society-domestic-drones. 
 
139 H.R. 637, § 3119c(c)(2)(B).  A “stipulated public area” is not defined in the bill.  It is 
unclear whether curtilage would be considered a private or public area. 
 
140 Id. at § 3119c(c)(2)(C). 
 
141 Id. at § 3119c(c)(2)(D)(i).  Requiring notice to each person on whom “covered 
information” was collected could become a daunting task for law enforcement.  A drone 
may very likely collect information that is “reasonably likely to enable identification of 
an individual” and many people may need to be notified.  Is the notice requirement 
necessary if the data collected must be discarded within a specific period of time and will 
not be used against the individual in future criminal proceedings? 
 
142 Id. at § 3119c(c)(2)(D)(ii)(I)-(III). 
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securing the border;”143 if “[t]he covered information that is collected or 
disclosed pertains to an individual who provides prior written consent to 
such collection or disclosure;”144 or if an emergency exists which involves 
“immediate danger of death or serious physical injury to any person; [] 
conspiratorial activities threatening the national security interest; or [] 
conspiratorial activities characteristic of organized crime.”145  In the case 
of an emergency, the agent must apply for a warrant or order no later than 
forty-eight hours after the drone operation begins.146 
 
[46] As for the private use of drones, the Act includes a paparazzi 
provision making it unlawful to intentionally operate a drone in a “manner 
that is highly offensive to a reasonable person” or to monitor persons 
engaging in personal or familial activities, when a reasonable expectation 
of privacy exists, and regardless of whether a physical trespass exists.147  
The Act also bans the weaponization of drones whether by law 
enforcement or private persons.148 
 
[47] Other pending federal legislation includes the Preserving Freedom 
from Unwarranted Surveillance Act of 2013,149 which prohibits the use of 
a drone to gather evidence of criminal conduct except as to the extent 
authorized by a warrant.150  Exceptions to the warrant requirement would                                                              
143 Id. at § 3119c(c)(3). 
 
144 H.R. 637, § 3119c(c)(4). 
 
145 Id. at § 3119c(c)(5)(A)(i)(I)-(III). 
 
146 Id. at § 3119c(c)(5)(B). 
 
147 Id. at § 3119f. 
 
148 Id. at § 3119h. 
 
149 Preserving Freedom from Unwarranted Surveillance Act of 2013, H.R. 972, 113th 
Cong. (2013). 
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include: patrolling United States borders, exigent circumstances, and 
situations entailing a high risk of a terrorist attack.151  The Act restricts the 
use of drones more than Fourth Amendment jurisprudence currently 
requires for a fixed-wing aircraft or helicopter.  The Drone Aircraft 
Privacy and Transparency Act of 2013152 and Safeguarding Privacy and 
Fostering Aerospace Innovation Act of 2013153 are two additional bills up 
for consideration before Congress. 
 
V.  INVESTIGATORY METHODS AND FOURTH AMENDMENT 
PROTECTIONS 
 
[48] It is clear from the recently passed and currently pending state and 
federal legislation on drones that the biggest concern lies in law 
enforcement’s use of drones for criminal investigative activities.  
Legislators fear we are one step closer to a 24-hour surveillance state and 
have chosen to pass laws restricting law enforcement’s use without much 
thought as to the Fourth Amendment and what exactly it protects against.  
In the past, legislators have waited for a Supreme Court decision before 
acting.  For example, the Supreme Court held that law enforcement 
needed a warrant before electronically eavesdropping on someone’s 
conversation in 1967;154 Congress then passed the federal wiretap statute, 
18 U.S.C. § 2511.155  In another instance, the Court held that law 
enforcement’s requests of the telephone company for real-time collection                                                                                                                                                        
150 Id. at § 2. 
 
151 Id. at § 3. 
 
152 Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act of 2013, H.R. 1262, 113th Cong. 
(2013).  
 
153 Safeguarding Privacy and Fostering Aerospace Innovation Act, S. 1057, 113th Cong. 
(2013).   
 
154 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 (1967). 
 
155 See 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2012). 
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of a target’s telephone numbers received and dialed did not trigger the 
Fourth Amendment;156 Congress subsequently passed the pen register 
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3121, and required a court order.157  Lastly, the Court 
held that an arrestee must be advised of his or her rights against self-
incrimination under the Fifth Amendment before interrogation;158 
Congress subsequently passed 18 U.S.C. § 3501, essentially attempting to 
overturn the Miranda decision.159  
 
[49] This proactive stance by state and federal legislatures and their 
aversion to drone use is a bit troubling, and appears to be a knee-jerk 
reaction to the idea of a “drone surveillance state.” Legislators have not 
fully explored which law enforcement investigatory tools trigger Fourth 
Amendment protections and which ones do not, and have not considered 
the ramifications of their hastily drafted laws.   
 
[50] Law enforcement has a select group of investigatory tools it can 
use without triggering Fourth Amendment protections.  Surveillance of 
suspects is one of the oldest tools that law enforcement has used to collect 
information and determine whether criminal activity is occurring. 160  It is 
one of the first steps of any criminal investigation.  The idea that a warrant 
would be needed to surveil a suspect would effectively cripple any 
investigation before it even got off the ground. 
                                                              
156 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979). 
 
157 See 18 U.S.C. § 3121(a) (2012). 
 
158 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966). 
 
159 See 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2012). 
 
160 See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (holding that police 
surveillance in areas generally observable by the public did not trigger Fourth 
Amendment protection). 
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[51] Only a certain number of investigatory tools are given Fourth 
Amendment protection.  If all investigatory tools were outside the Fourth 
Amendment, then it would be virtually impossible for law enforcement to 
ever gain probable cause to seek a warrant.  Therefore, law enforcement 
requires methods and tools that are permissible under Fourth Amendment 
protections in order to allow for the collection of sufficient information to 
use as probable cause for an arrest, search, or warrant for other, more 
intrusive investigatory tools. 
 
[52] During the investigative stage, law enforcement can request voice 
exemplars161 and handwriting samples162 from suspects, request 
information from third parties via subpoena,163 utilize informants to gather 
information on the suspect,164 sort through the suspect’s trash that has 
been discarded and abandoned,165 walk in open fields166 to inspect a 
marijuana grow operation or a barn converted into a methamphetamine 
lab, surveil suspects in public places via CCTV167 video cameras, monitor 
suspects while observing from a motor vehicle, aircraft or helicopter,168 or 
have a K-9 sniff the suspect’s luggage169 or car170 in order to detect the                                                              
161 See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1973). 
 
162 See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1967). 
 
163 See SEC v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 742 (1984). 
 
164 See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 311 (1966). 
 
165 See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-43 (1988). 
 
166 See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 176 (1984) (quoting Hester v. United 
States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924)). 
 
167 Closed-circuit television. 
 
168 See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 448 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 
213-14 (1986). 
 
169 See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983). 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XX, Issue 3  
 
33  
presence of contraband—all outside any constitutional protection the 
suspect might have.  However, in the past few years, the Court has begun 
to place additional limits on several of these heretofore lawful, 
investigatory tools which have been reevaluated from a Fourth 
Amendment perspective during the appeals process.    
 
[53] In United States v. Jones, the Court determined that law 
enforcement needed a warrant to place a GPS device on the suspect’s 
motor vehicle regardless of whether they intended to monitor the vehicle 
in public or private areas. 171  Also in Jones, Justice Sotomayor, in her 
concurring opinion, challenged the legality of the third party doctrine (the 
use of gathering information of the suspect that is in the hands of third 
parties via subpoena) and argued the Court should revisit this doctrine—
namely positing that law enforcement should need more than a subpoena 
to request bank records, e-mail subscriber information, or phone numbers 
dialed.172  In Florida v. Jardines, the Court held that law enforcement 
could not use K-9s to sniff the exterior of one’s home to detect the 
presence of narcotics.173  While a dog sniff of a car and a dog sniff of a 
suitcase or person in an airport were deemed acceptable, a dog sniff 
around the home became too intrusive and required a warrant.174  Aerial 
surveillance is similarly being scrutinized once again and is at risk of 
being moved from the outside the Fourth Amendment category to within 
Fourth Amendment protections as drone use is evaluated.  The question 
becomes: has the progression from using planes to helicopters to drones                                                                                                                                                        
170 See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005). 
 
171 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 
172 See id. at 956-57 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 
173 See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 1415 (2013). 
 
174 See id. at 1417-18 (“The government’s use of trained police dogs to investigate the 
home and its immediate surroundings is a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.”). 
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for surveillance purposes become much more intrusive and, therefore, 
should drone surveillance trigger the protections of the Fourth 
Amendment?    
 
[54] A common defense strategy in criminal proceedings is to challenge 
the law enforcement investigatory tool used to collect evidence.  Defense 
attorneys typically argue that a particular technique or tool violates their 
client’s Fourth Amendment rights, that is, “[t]he right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.”175  Some law enforcement techniques only fall 
under Fourth Amendment protection in specific circumstances, e.g., when 
the technique is deemed to be overly invasive or the suspect has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in this particular instance.176  If law 
enforcement were to examine a suspect’s e-mail or phone call content,177 
or electronically wiretap a particular phone,178 enter the home or curtilage 
of the suspect’s house, 179 look into the home using thermal imaging,180 
request fingernail scrapings,181 extract blood,182 or have a bullet surgically                                                              
175 U.S. CONST. amend IV. 
 
176 See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2000) (holding that using 
uncommon devices like Thermovision to “explore details of the home that would 
previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion” constitute a “search” under 
the Fourth Amendment).  
 
177 But cf. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (holding that a warrant is not 
required if law enforcement is only collecting the phone numbers received or dialed by 
the target phone). 
 
178 See, e.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58-59 (1967). 
 
179 See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180-81 (1984).  
 
180 See, e.g., Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40. 
 
181 See, e.g., Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 (1973). 
 
182 See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). 
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removed from a suspect,183 the Fourth Amendment has been triggered.  
The Fourth Amendment has two requirements/clauses: that the search be 
reasonable184 and that the warrant contain probable cause.185  Therefore, 
once the Fourth Amendment is triggered, investigators seek a warrant to 
counter any potential Fourth Amendment claims by the suspect made at a 
later date.  If they do not seek a warrant, law enforcement must allege that 
a specific exception to the warrant requirement applies.186    
 
[55] State legislatures have proceeded with the assumption that drone 
surveillance falls under Fourth Amendment protections and, therefore, law 
enforcement must obtain a warrant or show exigent circumstances exist 
(e.g., threat of a terrorist attack or reasonable suspicion of imminent 
danger to a person’s life) before the use of this technique.  This 
assumption is not necessarily justified. 
 
A.  Aerial Surveillance is Outside Fourth Amendment 
Protections. 
 
[56] The Fourth Amendment applies to government searches and 
seizures.  The Supreme Court determines whether the government action 
constitutes a search, such that the action violates one’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy,187 or if the action constitutes a trespass.188  In three 
cases, the Supreme Court ruled that aerial surveillance does not trigger the 
Fourth Amendment.  In California v. Ciraolo, the Court determined that                                                              
183 See, e.g., Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 765 (1985). 
 
184 U.S. CONST. amend IV; see, e.g., Camara v. Mun. Ct. S. F., 387 U.S. 523, 534-35 
(1967). 
 
185 U.S. CONST. amend IV; see, e.g., Camara, 387 U.S. at 534-35. 
 
186 See Camara, 387 U.S. at 529-30. 
 
187 See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 
188 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949-50 (2012).  
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law enforcement’s observation of a marijuana grow in the defendant’s 
back yard from a fixed-wing aircraft flying at 1000 feet was not a Fourth 
Amendment search.189  “[T]he home and its curtilage are not necessarily 
protected from inspection that involves no physical invasion.”190  Law 
enforcement was within FAA regulations for fixed-wing aircraft—and 
since the public was able to fly in the same navigable airspace and see the 
yard with the naked eye from an altitude of 1000 feet, observations during 
the flight did not constitute a “search” under the Fourth Amendment. 191  
In essence, Ciraolo had no reasonable expectation of privacy since anyone 
could take a plane ride and view him in his yard below, and there was no 
trespass because FAA regulations permits planes to fly within that 
airspace.  
 
[57] In Florida v. Riley, the Court found that observation from a 
helicopter flying at 400 feet was also not a Fourth Amendment search.192  
Flying at 400 feet was within current FAA regulations and any member of 
the public could have done the same.193  Riley failed to show “that 
helicopters flying at 400 feet are sufficiently rare . . . to lend substance to 
[Riley’s] claim that he reasonably anticipated that his greenhouse would 
not be subject to observation from that altitude.”194 
 
[58] In Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, the Environmental 
Protection Agency had an aerial photographer take pictures of Dow’s                                                              
189 See California v. Ciarolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986). 
 
190 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449 (1989) (explaining the Court’s reasoning in 
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207). 
 
191 See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213-14. 
 
192 See Riley, 488 U.S. at 448.  
 
193 See id. at 451. 
 
194 Id. at 451-452. 
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manufacturing facility while within navigable airspace. 195  The Court held 
that the open areas surrounding Dow’s industrial facility were similar to 
“open fields” and were “open to the view and observation of persons in 
aircraft lawfully in the public airspace immediately above or sufficiently 
near the area for the reach of cameras.”196  The taking of the aerial 
photographs did not constitute a “search” prohibited under the Fourth 
Amendment, as “[a]ny person with an airplane and an aerial camera could 
readily duplicate” the photographs that were taken. 197 
 
[59] If law enforcement drones are flown within FAA regulated 
navigable airspace, and civilians have the opportunity to fly their own 
drones commercially and privately in the same airspace, why would law 
enforcement need a warrant?  Is it because law enforcement uses its  
drones for criminal investigatory purposes, whereas a realtor uses his 
drone to take pictures of the area, a filmmaker to make a movie, a wildlife 
organization to monitor animals at the zoo or nature preserve, or a nosy 
homeowner who wants to spy on a neighbor’s outdoor activities?  
Understandably, the Fourth Amendment only protects citizens from 
government intrusion.198  However, if a private investigator, or a neighbor, 
or even a criminal actor can utilize a drone to surveil the local law 
enforcement agency building, why should local law enforcement be 
unable to do the same?  Moreover, the information gathered by law 
enforcement for a criminal investigation via drone technology would be 
less intrusive and less accessed than information gathered by a realtor in 
order to publish a full page advertisement in a local newspaper or 
magazine or by others who wish to use drones for other purposes.   
                                                              
195 See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 229 (1986). 
 
196 Id. at 239. 
 
197 Id. at 231. 
 
198 See, e.g., Guide for Users, 40 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 1, 3-4. 
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B.  The Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment Tools:    
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy and Trespass 
 
[60] The Supreme Court has done a good job in the past monitoring the 
grey area that surrounds the boundary between what constitutes a “search” 
and what does not constitute a “search.”  It uses the tools of trespass and 
what is considered a reasonable expectation of privacy to determine on 
what side law enforcement’s actions fall.199  Trespass was a long forgotten 
tool that recently gathered steam after the Jones decision.  A physical 
intrusion of a person, house, paper, or effect is deemed a “search.”200  
Thus, the F.B.I.’s placement of a GPS tracker on Jones’ vehicle was 
deemed a trespass of an “effect” and a Fourth Amendment “search,” thus 
requiring a warrant.201  The physical intrusion of a spike mike into the 
heating ducts of a suspect’s apartment constituted a “search” in Silverman 
v. United States.202  The physical intrusion into Ms. Mapp’s home without 
a valid warrant in Mapp v. Ohio constituted a “search” in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.203   
 
[61] The second tool the Court uses to determine what constitutes a 
“search” under the Fourth Amendment is to subject the law enforcement 
action to a Katz analysis.204  If law enforcement’s action violates the 
suspect’s expectation of privacy and society is prepared to recognize that 
expectation as reasonable, then law enforcement’s action constitutes a                                                              
199 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); see 
also United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953 (2012). 
 
200 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949-50. 
 
201 Id. at 946. 
 
202 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509 (1961). 
 
203 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961). 
 
204 Katz, 389 U.S. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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“search.”205  Thus a “search” is an action by the government that intrudes, 
however slightly, upon a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy.  The 
Katz analysis was originally designed to resolve issues arising from virtual 
intrusions rather than physical intrusions of a person, house, paper, or 
effect.  Katz’s conversation was silently monitored and listened to outside 
his physical presence, and it was a stretch to argue that the listening device 
taped to the top of the telephone booth constituted a “trespass.”206  The 
Court was more concerned about the violation of Katz’s privacy stemming 
from law enforcement’s uninvited ear rather than the physical trespass of 
the listening device, albeit slightly.207  Many believed trespass was no 
longer the mechanism by which the Court determined what constituted a 
“search.”  However, the Supreme Court corrected this misinterpretation in 
Jones by stating that Katz merely supplements trespass—therefore, the 
Court can use either trespass and/or the Katz analysis to determine what 
actions constitute a “search.”208 
 
[62] The Court has used these two theories to determine if a particular 
law enforcement action triggers Fourth Amendment protections.  The 
utilization of a thermal imaging device in Kyllo v. United States209 was 
found to constitute a “search” because it violated the suspect’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the home and because these types of thermal 
imaging devices were not generally available to the public.210  The Court 
has drawn a clear line that anything intruding into the home, physically, 
virtually, or otherwise constitutes a “search.”  The warrantless entry and                                                              
205 Id. 
 
206 Id. at 370 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 
207 Id. at 353. 
 
208 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953 (2012). 
 
209 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34-35 (2000). 
 
210 See id. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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search of a home is “the chief evil against which . . . the Fourth 
Amendment is directed.”211  “‘At the very core’ of the Fourth Amendment 
‘stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free 
from unreasonable government intrusion.’”212  Curtilage, the area 
immediately surrounding a dwelling in which the intimate, daily activities 
of family life are conducted, is also protected.213  The Court has reasoned 
that citizens have a reasonable expectation of privacy when they conduct 
activities in their front, side, and back yards.214  Therefore, the intrusion of 
a police-trained K-9 sniffing a suspect’s front door for the presence of 
narcotics violates that suspect’s expectation of privacy because the K-9 is 
within the curtilage and is not acting similar to a visitor or salesman 
soliciting at the front door.215  The Fourth Amendment does not protect 
open fields outside the curtilage.216  Under the plain view doctrine, what a 
                                                             
211 Id. at 46 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. U.S. Dist. Court of E. Dist. 
of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)). 
 
212 Id. at 31 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)). 
 
213 See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984). 
 
214 In United States v. Dunn, the Court identified four factors to determine what areas 
surrounding the home fall into the category of curtilage:  
 
[T]he proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, 
whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, 
the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken by 
the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by. 
 
480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987) (citations omitted). 
 
215 See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 1415-16 (2013). 
 
216 See Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58 (1924). 
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person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is 
not granted Fourth Amendment protection.217 
 
[63] Arguably, drone surveillance falls into this grey area.  Aircraft and 
helicopters that fly within FAA-regulated navigable airspace and monitor 
suspects’ activities in public areas fall outside the Fourth Amendment.  It 
is unclear why drones that also fly within FAA regulated navigable 
airspace and monitor suspects’ activities in public areas would not also fall 
outside the Fourth Amendment.  Where is the trespass?  As mentioned 
previously, owners can no longer claim they own the space above their 
land—flying machines in navigable airspace are not deemed to be 
trespassing.  Drones flying within FAA regulations at 1,000 feet for 
airplanes will be unable to see inside citizens’ homes.218  If we apply the 
FAA circular guidelines, small drones that weigh twenty-five pounds or 
less cannot be operated higher than 400 feet above the ground, must 
remain within the naked eyesight of the operator, and must fly a sufficient 
distance from populated areas.219  Therefore, drones would not be used at 
less than 400 feet in populated areas to peer in property owners’ windows.  
If a drone flies outside the navigable airspace or outside the naked 
eyesight of the operator in a populated area in the case of a small drone, 
then the action could be deemed a trespass and a “search.”  This alleviates 
any concern that drones will be used to lurk in backyards and spy through 
bedroom windows to capture intimate activities associated with the home.  
A drone might be able to see rooftops and backyard gardens or pools but 
from its aerial vantage viewpoint, it would not be able to see through 
windows and curtains unless it is flying at that level (which is not 
permissible via current FAA guidelines for model aircraft).  Drones will 
be able to view activities within the curtilage if not covered, but so can                                                              
217 See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); 
Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 213 (1966). 
 
218 Robert Molko, The Drones Are Coming!: Will the Fourth Amendment Stop Their 
Threat to Our Privacy?, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 1279 (2013). 
 
219 See supra text accompanying note 80.  
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aircraft and helicopters.  Therefore, it is unclear why drone use would 
constitute a trespass or be more intrusive than an aircraft or helicopter. 
 
[64] Does drone use by law enforcement violate a suspect’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy?  Drones have the ability to capture images of a 
suspect and his outdoor activities.  The pictures taken from drones may or 
may not be of better quality than those taken from an aircraft or helicopter, 
depending upon the sophistication and quality of the particular drone.  
Thus, it would be difficult to argue the images captured from law 
enforcement drones violate one’s right to privacy as similar technology is 
available to the public and the government. 
 
[65] Does the fact that some sophisticated drones have the ability to 
stay in the air and monitor a suspect’s activities for several hours create a 
situation where the suspect’s privacy is violated?  Boeing is in the process 
of designing a hydrogen-powered drone called the “Phantom Eye,” a 
“high altitude, long endurance Unmanned Air Vehicle (UAV) with a 270 
nm sensing line-of-sight, at 65,000 feet for up to 10 days without 
refueling.”220  The Court in Jones seemed to be concerned about this very 
thing—the closer technology moves towards twenty-four hour constant 
surveillance, the greater the possibility the technology is intruding into our 
right to privacy.221  Justice Alito explained that “the use of longer term 
GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on 
expectations of privacy. . . In this case, for four weeks, law enforcement 
agents tracked every movement that respondent made in the vehicle he 
was driving.”222   
                                                              
220 Arin Greenwood, Drone Conference 2013: Unmanned Vehicle Industry Worries Word 
'Drone' Has Negative Connotations, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 14, 2013), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/14/drone-convention-2013_n_3756641.html. 
 
221 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012).  
 
222 Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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[66] Most drones cannot stay in the air for more than an hour (with a 
few lasting perhaps for a day) before needing to land and refuel.223  Unlike 
GPS tracking, drones still require a flight operator at all times.  Drones 
may be easier to utilize compared to traditional aircraft but they are still 
more manpower-intensive than a GPS tracking device placed on a motor 
vehicle where data can be checked and downloaded every few days.   
 
C.  Right to Privacy Under the Due Process Clause versus the 
Right Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures Under the 
Fourth Amendment 
 
[67] Assuming that drones could monitor our activities 24/7 once we 
step out of our homes, how would that constitute a “search” under the 
Fourth Amendment?  In Jones, Justice Sotomayor argued that the 
government’s 24/7 collection of data from GPS trackers would add up to a 
“search” because the person’s right to privacy had been violated under the 
Fourth Amendment.  Oftentimes, in the drone context, a similar argument 
is made that the Fourth Amendment guarantees its citizens a right to 
privacy and that the 24/7 monitoring by drones would violate our right to 
privacy under the Fourth Amendment.  However, the right to privacy 
stems from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which 
states: “nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law.”224  Substantive due process generally bars                                                              
223 Most drones can last from a few minutes to an hour in flying time; the more expensive 
and sophisticated drones, such as the Global Hawk or Predator, can last more than a day 
in the air.  See Kara Plantoni, “That’s Professor Global Hawk: A Remote-Piloted 
Warrior Starts Flying for Science, AIR & SPACE MAG., 
http://www.airspacemag.com/flight-today/thats-professor-global-hawk-433583/?no-ist 
(last visited Mar. 25, 2014); see also Global Hawk—Performance and Specifications, 
NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., 
http://www.nasa.gov/centers/dryden/aircraft/GlobalHawk/performance.html (last visited 
Mar. 5, 2014); Predator B UAS, GEN. ATOMICS AERONAUTICAL, http://www.ga-
asi.com/products/aircraft/predator_b.php (last visited Mar. 5, 2014). 
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federal and state governments from depriving anyone’s life, liberty, or 
property by means of a law found to be arbitrary and/or unreasonable.225  
The Fourth Amendment does not guarantee a right to privacy, rather it 
adds to the privacy analysis in the criminal procedural context by placing 
certain restrictions on law enforcement actions. 
 
[68] Privacy rights have their foundations rooted in family law, rather 
than in criminal procedure.  Meyer v. Nebraska,226 Griswold v. 
Connecticut,227 and Lawrence v. Texas228 were significant family law 
cases that recognized a constitutional right to privacy under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.229  In 1923, Meyer 
challenged a Nebraska statute that prohibited any person from teaching 
languages other than English, except to pupils who had successfully 
completed the eighth grade and classified a violation as a misdemeanor.230  
The Court found that Meyer had a right to teach German to a ten-year-old 
child under the Fourteenth Amendment: 
 
While this court has not attempted to define with exactness 
the liberty thus guaranteed, . . . [w]ithout doubt, it denotes                                                                                                                                                        
224 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  
 
225 See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479 (1965); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).  
 
226 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 
227 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 
228 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 
229 “No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process 
of law.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 
230 See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 396. 
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not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right 
of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the 
common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, 
to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to 
worship God according to the dictates of his own 
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long 
recognized at common law as essential to the orderly 
pursuit of happiness by free men. . . . Determination by the 
legislature of what constitutes proper exercise of police 
power is not final or conclusive but is subject to 
supervision by the courts.231 
 
[69] In 1965, the Court in Griswold further explained that: 
 
specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, 
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give 
them life and substance. . . .  Various guarantees create 
zones of privacy.  The right of association contained in the 
penumbra232 of the First Amendment is one, as we have 
seen. . . .  The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the 
“right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.”233 
                                                              
231 Id. at 399-400 (citations omitted). 
 
232 According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, a penumbra is “a space of partial 
illumination (as in an eclipse) between the perfect shadow on all sides and the full 
light.”Penumbra Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/penumbra (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).   
 
233 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV).  
In Griswold, the appellants argued a criminal statute prohibiting persons from giving 
information, instruction, and medical advice to married persons on means of preventing 
conception was unconstitutional via the Fourteenth Amendment.  See id. at 484-85. 
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Justice Black, in his Griswold dissent, stated, “I like my privacy as well as 
the next one, but I am nevertheless compelled to admit that government 
has a right to invade it unless prohibited by some specific constitutional 
provision.”234 
 
[70] Justice Stewart, also dissenting in Griswold, stated, “With all 
deference, I can find no such general right of privacy in the Bill of Rights, 
in any other part of the Constitution, or in any case ever before decided by 
this Court.”235  Lastly, in 2003, the plaintiff in Lawrence argued that a 
Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage 
in certain intimate sexual conduct was unconstitutional and violated one’s 
right to privacy.236  The Court stated that:  
 
Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government 
intrusions into a dwelling or other private places.  In our 
tradition the State is not omnipresent in the home.  And 
there are other spheres of our lives and existence, outside 
the home, where the State should not be a dominant 
presence.  Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds.  Liberty 
presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of 
thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.237   
 
Thus, the Texas statute furthered “no legitimate state interest which can 
justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.”238  
                                                              
234 Id. at 510 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 
235 Id. at 530. 
 
236 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562-63 (2003). 
 
237 Id. at 562. 
 
238 Id. at 578. 
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[71] In essence, the Due Process Clause created the model by which the 
government cannot create laws infringing on our personal freedoms.  
However, the Fourth Amendment has a different goal.  With a general 
right to privacy already established under the Due Process Clause, the 
Fourth Amendment focuses on the limits on the government’s ability to 
investigate and enforce criminal laws.  As we exercise our right to be free, 
the government cannot unreasonably monitor us for criminal activity 
without good cause and it cannot be unduly intrusive.  Thus, the 
government must perform a balancing test—balancing our right to privacy 
against our need to be monitored to prevent criminal activity and harm to 
society from occurring.  Therefore, we may have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the collection of data 24/7, but the question under the Fourth 
Amendment is not whether we have an expectation of privacy, but 
whether the government’s action is unreasonable.   
 
[72] The European Convention on Human Rights explains the 
intersection between this right to privacy and the government’s need to 
monitor:  
 
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and 
family life, his home and his correspondence. 
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with 
the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance 
with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of national security, public safety or the economic 
well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or 
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.239 
 
[73] Thus, under the Due Process Clause, the government does not have 
the right to interfere with our right to be free, to express ourselves as we                                                              
239 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 8, 
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 2309. 
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choose, and to keep our private lives private, separate and apart from 
government interference.  Law enforcement should not intrude into our 
private lives unless they have sufficient justification to do so, and their 
justification must be deemed reasonable.  A bird’s eye view of our actions 
outside our homes, mowing the lawn, driving to appointments, running 
errands, driving to work, daycare, or social events, or working in the 
garden are all actions we have the right to do under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause—but we have no inviolate expectation 
that knowledge of these activities will be kept private.  The Fourth 
Amendment is triggered only in our private spaces when the intrusion into 
our privacy is so great that it outweighs the government’s justification for 
doing so.  The Court has drawn the line between government monitoring 
of public areas and private areas.  The government interferes with our 
right to privacy when our private spaces are violated.  Drones, unless 
equipped with thermal imaging, infrared, or highly sophisticated and 
intrusive technology, would not interfere and intrude into private spaces.  
Therefore, we may have an expectation of privacy that we will not be 
monitored in public spaces, but it is reasonable for the government to do 
so.  In graphic form, the Due Process Clause and Fourth Amendment 
would look as follows: 
 
The Due Process Clause:  The Fourth Amendment:  











[74] The Due Process Clause establishes our right to privacy, and the 
Fourth Amendment permits law enforcement intrusion into our privacy if 
Reasonable Unreasonable 
Government Government 
Action = NO Action = 
Warrant  Warrant 
Requirement Requirement 
(Minimal Privacy) (Zone of Privacy 
Exists)     
Fundamental 
Freedoms, including 
Right to Privacy 
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that intrusion is reasonable.  The concern that government surveillance 
may reveal where we eat, when we go to the gynecologist, where we go to 
church, who we visit, etc. and that, therefore, the Fourth Amendment’s 
right to privacy is triggered, is only the first step in a Fourth Amendment 
analysis.  One more question must be asked.  The Due Process Clause 
gives us a right to do these things without government intrusion, but the 
question then becomes whether the surveillance tool law enforcement used 
was reasonable.  The government needs the ability to perform its duties to 
protect its citizens and have the mechanisms by which to do so.  Do we 
deem this type of monitoring of our actions reasonable?  If so, then no 
warrant is required.  If not, then the Fourth Amendment is triggered and a 
warrant is required.   
 
[75] Many of the activities we are free to do are no longer considered 
“private.”  As Justice Alito points out in Jones:  
 
[T]he Katz test rests on the assumption that this 
hypothetical reasonable person has a well-developed and 
stable set of privacy expectations.  But technology can 
change those expectations.  Dramatic technological change 
may lead to periods in which popular expectations are in 
flux and may ultimately produce significant changes in 
popular attitudes.  New technology may provide increased 
convenience or security at the expense of privacy, and 
many people find the tradeoff worthwhile.  And even if the 
public does not welcome the diminution of privacy that 
new technology entails, they may eventually reconcile 
themselves to this development as inevitable.240   
 
Less emphasis needs to be placed on privacy and more emphasis must be 
placed on whether the tool used is reasonable. 
  
                                                             
240 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962 (2012) (Alito, J. concurring).  
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[76] Moreover, our right to privacy has been diminished by our own 
desires to use drones for our own personal use.  Fewer and fewer 
investigatory tools are deemed intrusive (and violate our right to privacy) 
as we, as a society, have deliberately exposed our once private lives into 
the public arena.  Once our thoughts, photographs, and private information 
are placed on third party, public sites, it is unreasonable to ask law 
enforcement not to look at them.241  If we deem it reasonable that private, 
third parties may view the data we disclose, then we must deem it 
reasonable for law enforcement to examine it.  A third party’s reason for 
viewing may be different from law enforcement’s reason, but the concern 
is not the purpose for which it is viewed, it is the concern that it violates 
our right to privacy.  Therefore, the privacy debate is diminished because 
we, as a society, have let it become diminished through our own actions 
towards greater public exposure.  We have decided that being seen and 
heard is more important than keeping our private actions private.   
 
VI.  THE REAL FEAR BEHIND DRONE USE: GOVERNMENT ABUSE 
 
[77] If privacy is not the real concern behind drone use, perhaps it is the 
fear of law enforcement abuse.  If law enforcement uses drone technology 
to target particular areas of the community and randomly “search for 
crime,” is there another way to keep law enforcement in check than to say 
drone use automatically triggers the Fourth Amendment and requires a 
warrant?  General crime monitoring has never been considered an 
acceptable practice by the Court.242  Drones should be used only for 
investigations of specific targets, not merely to “look for crime.”  Citizens 
of the United States do not want to become citizens of the next Soviet 
Union where agents and drones randomly patrol for criminal or anti-state 
activity.  Citizens fear that regular drone flights might inadvertently                                                              
241 See, e.g., People v. Harris, 945 N.Y.S.2d 505, 509 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2012). 
 
242 “We decline to suspend the usual requirement of individualized suspicion where the 
police seek to employ a checkpoint primarily for the ordinary enterprise of investigating 
crimes.”  City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000).   
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collect data from a whole range of individuals unrelated to a specific 
investigation.   
 
[78] The answer lies not in requiring a warrant or a particular exception 
to the warrant requirement, but in requiring law enforcement to seek a 
court order similar to that required for a pen register under 18 U.S.C § 
2703.243  To obtain such a court order, law enforcement officials would 
need to demonstrate specific and articulable facts indicating that the data 
is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.  This would prevent law 
enforcement from using drones to randomly search for crime in a 
particular area.  The order would specify the identity, if known, of the 
person who is the subject of the criminal investigation and whom law 
enforcement would like to surveil and describe the particularized need for 
the information that can be gathered with the drone.244 
 
[79] The order also should contain language requiring law enforcement 
to discard any information collected by the drone that is not relevant to the 
scope of the investigation within twenty-four to forty-eighty hours.  This 
requirement would alleviate any concerns that the government would 
collect this information for other nefarious purposes in the future.  Being 
that it is a court order, this requirement would have teeth as long as 
magistrates signing these orders follow up and demand that law 
enforcement demonstrate that they in fact have complied with the order 
and destroyed any irrelevant information.  If a law enforcement officer 
fails to comply, a variety of sanctions could be used to demand                                                              
243 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 738 n.1 (1979) 
(quoting United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 161 n.1 (1977)) (“A pen 
register is a mechanical device that records the numbers dialed on a telephone by 
monitoring the electrical impulses caused when the dial on the telephone is released.  It 
does not overhear oral communications and does not indicate whether calls are actually 
completed.”).  
 
244 This language is similar to the language required in a pen register court order under 18 
U.S.C. § 3123(b)(1). 
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compliance.  Sanctions even as severe as jail time would cause any law 
enforcement agent to comply fully. 
 
[80] The court order also should include a penalty for disclosing to 
unauthorized persons data obtained from a drone, thereby limiting 
exposure of the information to government personnel working on the 
particular case, similar to grand jury secrecy requirements under the 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e).245  Under Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 6(e)(7), “[a] knowing violation of Rule 6 . . . may be 
punished as a contempt of court.”246  Moreover, if the drone is flown 
outside the FAA regulated navigable airspace and views activity not 
within the public’s vantage point, penalties should also be in place to 
punish those individuals in violation of strict flight guidelines provided in 
the court order.  Punishing individual agents with contempt of court holds 
both law enforcement and judges accountable and likely will serve as a 
more effective means to prevent government abuse than requiring 
warrants prior to drone flights. 
 
[81] The requirement of a court order similar to that found pursuant to 
18 U.S.C. § 2703 eliminates the charade of fitting drone use within the 
Fourth Amendment context.  Instead, it mandates a standard similar to that 
required for any information the government requests via a court order, 
such as a request for a pen register.247  While the Supreme Court deemed a 
pen register to be outside the Fourth Amendment, Congress later passed 
18 U.S.C. § 2703 to provide some protections against governmental 
abuse.248  Drone use does not give rise to privacy issues; it gives rise to                                                              
245 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2). 
 
246 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(7). 
 
247 See § 2703 (defining the narrow circumstances under which the government may 
obtain a wiretap). 
 
248 Id.; Smith, 442 U.S. at 745-46, superseded by statute, Stored Communications Act, 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711. 
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concerns of government abuse and should follow the pen register 
precedent.249   
 
[82] The U.S. Constitution contains no express right to privacy, but the 
Fourth Amendment provides certain guarantees for the privacy of the 
person and possessions.250  The “liberty” guarantee of the Fourteenth 
Amendment has been broadly interpreted to guarantee a fairly broad right 
of privacy and privacy issues.251  The Court can address the possible 
infringement on these undefined privacy issues by focusing on the legality 
of drone surveillance through the prism of “reasonable” use.  If law 
enforcement utilizes the drone to collect data that is relevant to a 
particular, ongoing investigation, then the drone use is reasonable.252  The 
greater the intrusiveness of the investigatory tool, the greater the 
possibility that tool will move into the “search” category of the Fourth 
Amendment, at which point the tool becomes unreasonable without a 
warrant.253  Therefore, a drone that hovers around bedroom windows and 
takes photographs of the lady of the house taking her daily sauna would be 
intrusive and unreasonable and would constitute a “search” under the 
Fourth Amendment (as would a drone with thermal imaging or x-ray 
capabilities), and a warrant is required.  However, if the lady of the house 
chooses to walk outside and tend to her garden in her front yard, she must 
come to terms with the fact that prying eyes may be watching—whether it                                                              
249 However, in order to truly attempt to curb government abuse, it would be imperative 
that magistrate judges develop procedures that would track and monitor agents who had 
been issued court orders authorizing drone use. 
 
250 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967). 
 
251 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129 (1973) (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)). 
 
252 See, e.g., Anderson v. Mergenhagen, 283 Ga. App. 546, 551 (2007) (quoting 
Ellenberg v. Pinkerson’s, 130 Ga. App. 254, 256-57 (1973)). 
 
253 See, e.g., Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001). 
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be realtors, Hollywood filmmakers, or law enforcement.  The tool used in 
public areas is reasonable and can be utilized without a warrant.  It would 
be reasonable for any of these actors to come across the gardener in the 
process of conducting their own drone projects.  If law enforcement 
requested the utilization of a drone via a § 2703 court order to assist them 
in the surveillance of a real-time drug transaction and happen upon the 
lady of the house tending her marijuana garden, then it would be 
reasonable for the government to use that evidence against her in a 
criminal prosecution.254  Language in the court order should allow for the 
subsequent use of this type of information.  Once outside, the lady of the 
house takes the risk that her actions will be seen; our zones of privacy 
where a warrant is required have traditionally been reserved for our indoor 
activities.  
 
[83] Our right to privacy stems from our desire to be free from 
governmental interference in our daily lives.  In the Fourth Amendment 
context, we have a right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures and a right to be free from governmental abuse.  However, these 
protections do not extend to any limitation on law enforcement’s use of 
drone surveillance in public areas for a specific purpose.  There is no 
realistic expectation of privacy when a drone passes over one’s house or 
car or observes our activity in public.  We gave up the luxury of privacy in 
public places long ago.   
 
[84] Drone use by law enforcement must be limited but not unduly 
subjected to Fourth Amendment scrutiny, as drones should not constitute a 
“search.”  To limit the temptation to use drones to “look for crime,” law 
enforcement could be subject to the court order process prior to utilizing a 
drone in an investigation.  
 
                                                             
254 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012). 
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[85] In my opinion, in the following scenarios drone use by law 
enforcement might fall closer towards a “search” under the Fourth 
Amendment and a warrant would most likely be required: 
 
(1) The drone is flown outside FAA navigable airspace for aircraft 
and helicopters (below 400 feet); 
(2) The drone collects information emanating from within the 
home (similar to thermal imaging or infrared sensors that 
detect movement); 
(3) Law enforcement uses highly sophisticated technology that is 
not commercially available (e.g., automated license plate 
readers or facial recognition technology); 
(4) The drone hovers around a particular area which may 
constitute a long-term sustained monitoring as mentioned in 
Jones, and a reasonable expectation of privacy is triggered; or 
(5) The drone hovers and creates an undue amount of wind, noise, 
dust, or threat of injury that could constitute a “trespass.” 
 
[86] Fourth Amendment cases invoking the Katz or Jones doctrines all 
touch upon  
 
the nature of the technology used (does it permit the 
government to “see” what would otherwise be invisible to 
the naked eye, even in daylight, from a lawful vantage 
point) and the nature of the place being observed (is it an 
open field, the curtilage of a home, commercial property as 
in Dow Chemical, or the interior of a home?).255   
 
The more a drone operates outside of FAA guidelines and the more a 
drone causes undue dust, noise, and wind, the more the drone operation 
will constitute a trespass and the Fourth Amendment is triggered.  The                                                              
255 1 JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: 
INVESTIGATION 95 (6th ed. 2013). 
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more a drone uses highly sophisticated technology not available for public 
use or collects information from inside the home, the more the drone 
operation will constitute a “search” under the Fourth Amendment as 
citizens will have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area and 
activities being observed. 
 
[87] Therefore, drones that fly within FAA navigable airspace, 
observing private property below that can be seen by the public in an 
aircraft, and using commercially available cameras or enhanced sensory 
technology, would fall outside Fourth Amendment protections and should 
be regulated via court order as previously suggested.   
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
[88] The use of drones by law enforcement does not trigger Fourth 
Amendment protections.  Drone surveillance does not constitute a trespass 
nor does it violate one’s reasonable expectation of privacy.  As a society, 
we have begun to accept a diminished expectation of privacy.  The real 
question becomes one of reasonableness and whether the use of drones is 
deemed a reasonable, acceptable law enforcement investigatory tool 
without requiring a warrant. 
 
[89] Most reasonable people, if asked, would deem it acceptable to 
allow the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to place cameras in 
areas where companies are known to dump toxic chemicals in order to 
catch the violators.  Most reasonable people, if asked, would likely deem it 
acceptable and prudent for the EPA to place mobile cameras along 
sections of a polluted river to monitor for illegal dumping.  Is it then 
logical to assume it acceptable and prudent for the EPA to utilize drones 
equipped with cameras to monitor the river for illegal dumping? 
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[90] Drones equipped with a type of mobile camera are used by the 
Forest Service to monitor for forest fires.256  Should drone film footage be 
admissible as evidence at a criminal trial if the drone captures an arsonist 
starting a forest fire?  Ditto when a drone captures images of a suspected 
marijuana field?   
 
[91] Society appears to be comfortable with cameras in public areas.  
After the Boston Marathon bombing in April 2013, law enforcement 
obtained photographs from store surveillance cameras in order to identify 
the Boston bomber.257  Rather than public outrage at the excessive use of 
surveillance cameras for law enforcement purposes, the public demanded 
that more be done by law enforcement.  There was strong public interest in 
catching the bombing suspects.  In cities such as Washington D.C. and 
New York City, cameras are everywhere.258  Google Earth and satellite 
technology have become commonplace.  Drones equipped with cameras 
are simply the latest in surveillance technology.  The public is not as 
concerned about government surveillance in public areas as it once was. 
 
[92] Whether our right to privacy is being violated by the increased use 
of drones by law enforcement is not the true issue.  Commercially, the use 
of drones in the private sector is becoming even more pervasive.  The 
concern is law enforcement abuse—that the government will collect the 
video and photographs from drone surveillance for a purportedly 
legitimate purpose only to use this material for other nefarious or                                                              
256 See Amy Gahran, Fighting Fire with Data, Spacecraft, Drones, CNN (July 26, 2012, 
9:37 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/26/tech/innovation/technology-fighting-fire/. 
 
257 See Bev Ford, Greg B. Smith, & Larry McShane, Police Narrow in on Two Suspects 




258 See, e.g., Allison Linn, Post 9/11, Surveillance Cameras Everywhere, 
NBCNEWS.com, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/44163852/ns/business-us_business/t/post-
surveillance-cameras-everywhere/#.U1P5qvldWSo (last updated Aug. 23, 2011). 
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illegitimate purposes.  As one judge who was critical of the government 
explained in a false arrest tort case,  
 
In Hamlet’s soliloquy, one of the “whips and scorns” which 
led the great Dane to consider whether death was better 
than life was “the insolence of office.”  In those few words, 
the Bard managed to express the aggravations and futilities 
pressed on any of us when public officials vent their sour 
stomachs in performing their duties.  The authority to wear 
a badge or to wield a pen in power over others seems to 
fuel in us a sense of mastery, and not of service.  It is a 
common failing, and all of us public servants succumb to it 
at some point.259 
 
[93] While the judge in this false arrest case may have been referring to 
either inappropriate behavior by Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) 
officials, or possibly the police officers who took their cues from these 
DMV officials, the message is clear: we must find ways to keep law 
enforcement officials in check.  In this new age of openness and desire for 
public exposure, privacy rights and levels of intrusiveness are not as 
important as whether the law enforcement action is reasonable.  Drone use 
is not a trespass and does not violate one’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy.  The use of drones by law enforcement must be regulated, but this 
technique falls outside of Fourth Amendment protections as it does not 
constitute a “search.”  Therefore, it would be better for legislators and 
courts alike to request that law enforcement seek a court order when 
contemplating the use of drones similar to authorizations needed for a pen 
register. 
 
[94] If state and federal legislators are successful and remain on a 
determined course to restrict application of drones, drone use may be 
severely limited, similar to what took place after the court decision on                                                              
259 Wright v. State, 752 P.2d 748, 751 (Mont. 1988) (Sheehy, J., dissenting). 
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thermal imaging.  After the Kyllo decision in which the Court held that 
thermal imaging constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment,260 law 
enforcement was no longer able to use the technology to assist in building 
sufficient probable cause for a search warrant.  Admittedly, thermal 
imaging allows law enforcement the ability to collect intelligence within 
private dwellings, i.e., locations where the owner has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.  Drone surveillance collects intelligence in public 
areas where there is no such expectation of privacy.  Law enforcement 
needs a variety of investigatory tools that can be used without a warrant in 
order to gather enough facts for probable cause to justify search and arrest 
warrants.  If government becomes significantly limited in its ability to 
collect information in a reasonable and impartial manner, the ability to 
investigate a complaint and determine if a crime has been committed will 
be hindered.  Drone use is a reasonable, non-intrusive technique and 
should be one of those investigatory tools available to law enforcement 
agencies.  Public safety requires that law enforcement have the ability to 
leverage every reasonable investigatory tool at its disposal to uphold the 
law and bring criminals to justice.  Some techniques which are intrusive 
and infringe on privacy issues need to be closely monitored and regulated.  
 
[95] Public concern is understandable—thousands of drones from both 
the public and private sector will soon be accumulating a significant 
amount of information once FAA regulations are put in place by 2015.  
Drone technology is in its infancy stage.  Future drones may be lighter, 
simpler, with longer flight times and have the ability to act/react to given 
situations based on software programming without human intervention.  
Previously, laws were passed to regulate new technology after its effects 
and impact on society were determined.  In the case of drones, state and 
federal legislatures are attempting to get ahead of the curve and pass laws 
based on what drones can be expected to do in the future.  I think we are 
getting ahead of ourselves.  The drones of today are the same as aircraft 
and helicopters which are currently used to conduct aerial surveillance.                                                               
260 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34-35 (2001). 
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There is no need to place greater restrictions on drones than regular 
aircraft.  The unintended victims of such a law would be smaller law 
enforcement agencies that cannot afford their own aircraft or helicopter.  
Inexpensive drone technology would allow all law enforcement agencies 
to operate on a level playing field in the use of aerial surveillance for 
investigations.  
 
[96] From binoculars, to flashlights, to drones, companies will continue 
to design enhanced surveillance techniques and their requisite sensory 
enhancements for both law enforcement and private use.  Future court 
decisions will determine if these new technologies and enhancements fall 
outside of or are subject to Fourth Amendment protections (e.g., future 
drones installed with infrared sensors, facial recognition technology, 
license plate readers, or drones designed with solar power to stay aloft for 
longer periods of time).  These law enforcement technologies will face 
constant scrutiny for their possible infringement on our expectations of 
privacy, and will be re-evaluated again and again. 
 





DRONE LEGISLATION BY STATE261 
 
TABLE 1: PASSED LEGISLATION 
 
State Bill # Status of Bill Law Enforcement Restrictions 
Florida F.S.A. § 934.50 Legislation effective as 
of 01 July 2013 
Law Enforcement can only use 
drones when (1) combating an 
eminent threat of terrorism; (2) 
pursuant to a search warrant; (3) 
preventing imminent death or severe 
bodily harm. 
Idaho I.C. § 21-213 Legislation effective as 
of 01 July 2013 
Requires warrant, except for 
emergency response for safety, 
search and rescue or controlled 
substance investigations. 
Illinois 725 Ill. Comp. 
Stat. 167/1 et 
seq. 
Legislation effective as 
of 01 January 2014 
Requires warrant except to prevent 
terrorist attack, pursuant to a warrant, 
prevent death or severe bodily harm, 
prevent escape or a suspect, or to 
protect evidence.  Must destroy all 
information gathered within 30 days 
unless there is a pending 
investigation or trial.  Must make an 
annual report on drone usage. 
Indiana HB 1009 Legislation will be 
effective as of 01 July 
2014 
Law enforcement must obtain search 
warrant except in cases of: (1) 
exigent circumstances; (2) where 
there is a substantial likelihood of 
terrorist attack; (3) when conducting 
search and rescues; (4) where 
mitigating or responding to natural 
disasters; or (5) for surveys not used                                                              261 Data updated through June 10, 2014.  ** denotes FAA test site. 
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for criminal justice purposes. 
Iowa HF 2289 Signed by Governor 
May 23, 2014 
Information obtained by use of drone 
is inadmissible unless secured with 
use of warrant or otherwise obtained 
in a manner that is consistent with 
state and federal law.  Drones may 
not be used for traffic law 
enforcement. 
Montana Mont. Code 
Ann. § 46-5-
109 
Legislation effective as 
of 01 October 2013 
Requires warrant or any judicially 
recognized exception.  Cannot use 
information gathered via drone in an 
application or affidavit for a warrant. 
Oregon Or. Rev. Stat. § 
837.300 et seq. 
Effective as of June 29, 
2013 
Requires warrant unless there is a 
reasonable belief that there is a threat 
of bodily harm or death and an 
affidavit is filed within 48 hours, to 
reconstruct a crime scene, for search 
and rescue operations, or during a 
declared state of emergency for 
public safety purposes only.  Drones 
may not be weaponized. 
Tennessee Tenn. Code 
Ann. §39-13-
609 
Legislation effective as 
of 01 July 2013; 2014 
legislation enacted, goes 
into effect July 1, 2014 
Requires warrant or used to combat 
terrorist threat, there is reasonable 
suspicion that there is an imminent 
threat to life, to prevent escape of 
suspect, or to search for a missing 
person.  Specifically designates 
drone use as a search and the search 
shall comply with the federal and TN 
Constitutions.  However, only 
exceptions to the warrant 
requirement listed in this statute 
apply. 
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Texas** Tex. Gov’t 
Code §423 et. 
Seq. 
Legislation effective as 
of Sept. 1, 2013 
Requires warrant or pursuit of a 
suspect, documentation of a crime 
scene, when searching for a missing 
person, in a tactical situation where 
there is a threat to human life, or 
where a property owner consents to 
law enforcement.  The Department of 
Public Safety shall adopt rules and 
guidelines for use of an unmanned 
aircraft by a law enforcement 
authority in this state.  Must make a 
report of drone usage in January of 
every odd numbered year. 
Utah S.B. 16702 Legislation enacted, 
goes into effect May 13, 
2014. 
Requires warrant, judicially 
recognized exception to warrant 
requirement, or use by 
nongovernmental actor acting in 
good faith and where data pertains to 
imminent or ongoing emergency 
involving danger of death or serious 
bodily harm. 
Virginia** H. 2012  Legislation effective as 
of July 1, 2013; 2014 
bill introduced; 
legislature adjourned 
without further action 
Prohibits usage of drone prior to July 
1, 2013 except for amber alerts, 
search and rescue, training, and 
National Guard use. 
Wisconsin S.B. 196 Legislation enacted, 
went into effect April 9, 
2014. 
Law Enforcement agents must obtain 
a warrant in order to use drone 
except when used to assist search and 
rescue operations, location of 
escaped prisoners, or where there is 
imminent danger to an individual or 
of destruction of property. 
 




TABLE 2: PENDING LEGISLATION 
 
State Bill # Status of Bill Law Enforcement Restrictions 
Alabama SB317 Passed Senate. Law Enforcement can only use 
drones when (1) combating an 
eminent threat of terrorism; (2) 
pursuant to a search warrant; (3) 
preventing imminent death or severe 
bodily harm. 
Alaska** HCR 6 Legislative Resolution 
17 passed; legislature 
adjourned 
Creates a task force to assist the FAA 
with creating a safe place for the 
testing of drones and development of 
adequate safety procedures for future 
drone use. 
 H.B. 209 Referred to Judiciary Law Enforcement can only use drone 
if authorized by search warrant, 
except that peace officers may use 
drone to assist during an emergency 
involving imminent danger of death 
or serious physical injury to a person 
or property. 
Arizona HB 2269 Referred to Senate 
Rules Committee  
Law Enforcement can only use 
drones when (1) Combating an 
eminent threat of terrorism; (2) 
pursuant to a search warrant; (3) 
preventing imminent death or severe 
bodily harm. 
 HB 2538 Referred to House 
Judiciary Committee 
Law Enforcement can only use drone 
if authorized by search warrant. 
California AB 1327 Passed House and 
passed Senate 
committee 
Requires warrant, or use to prevent 
imminent severe bodily harm or 
death, hot pursuit, or first responder 
situations. 
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Connecticut HB 5217 Pending before Joint 
Judiciary Committee 
Law Enforcement can only operate 
drones for legitimate law 
enforcement purposes and only 
pursuant to warrant or emergency 
circumstances. 
Georgia H.B. 560 In Judiciary Committee Creates misdemeanor for anyone 
who knowingly violates or 
knowingly assists someone in 
violating statute.    Law enforcement 
must have a warrant, no exceptions. 
 S.B. 200 In Judiciary Committee Allows for exigent circumstances 
exception.  Drones may only be used 
in investigations of felonies, not 
misdemeanors. 
Hawaii S.B. 783 Passed Senate; 
legislature adjourned 
without further action. 
S.B. Must have a warrant unless used 
to prevent reasonably certain severe 
bodily harm or death.  Supervisor 
must file with the circuit court a 
sworn statement describing the 
emergency. 
 H.B 1691 Referred to 
Transportation 
Committee 
Law enforcement can only use drone: 
(1) to counter high risk of terrorist 
attack; (2) pursuant to valid search 
warrant; (3) in accordance with 
judicially recognized exception to 
warrant; (4) where swift action is 
needed. 
Kansas H.B. 2683 Referred to Committee 
on Federal and State 
Affairs 
H.B. Requires threat of terrorist 
activity and warrant. 
 S.B. 409 Committee 
recommended bill be 
passed 
Requires warrant or emergency 
situation. 
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Kentucky H.B. 342  Introduced; legislature 
adjourned without 
further action 
Requires search warrant, unless no 
part of any information or evidence is 
used in any legal proceeding or for 
any intelligence purposes, or is used 
by active service members stationed 
within the Commonwealth. 
Louisiana SB 330 Involuntarily deferred in 
committee 
Contains very few meaningful 
protections from drone surveillance 
by law enforcement. 
Massachusetts Bill H. 1357 Introduced Requires warrant, non-law 
enforcement use or emergency with 
sworn statement filed with the court 
within 48 hours.  Restricts use of 
biometric software to the target.  
Requires data destruction after 24 
hours unless pending investigation or 
trial.  Courts shall report the number 
of uses of drones annually. 
Michigan H.B. 4455 Introduced Absolute ban on armed drones.  
Drone must clearly indicate what 
agency it belongs to.  Requires 
warrant, imminent threat to life or 
severe bodily harm, or other 
emergency.  Requires filing of sworn 
statement within 48 hours if used 
without warrant.  Narrow tailoring of 
observation and recordings to target.  
Data is destroyed within 24 hours 
unless used for investigation.  Very 
detailed reporting to legislature 3 
times/ year. 
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Missouri H.B. 1204 Placed on informal 
calendar 
Requires warrant, emergency 
situation, or where used to assess 
necessity of first responders. 
Nevada** SCR 7 Introduced, but no 
further action.  Next 
legislative session 
begins February 2015 
Compels state to actively compete 
for FAA approval to be a drone 
testing site. 
New York** Bill No. 
A06370 / 
A08091/S04537 
Introduced Requires warrant unless there is a 
reasonable belief that there is an 
imminent danger to life. 
North 
Carolina 
H312 Two-year moratorium 
enacted (PDF, p. 41) in 
2013. Legislature is 
engaged in an interim 
study process that will 
likely produce further 
legislation.  
Must have a warrant unless used to 
prevent harm to life or property, 
prevent the escape of a suspect, or 
prevent imminent destruction of 
evidence.  Supervisor must file with 
the circuit court a sworn statement 
describing the emergency within 48 
hours.  Law enforcement must 
provide annual report on its drone 
usage. 
Ohio H.B. 207 Committee Report Requires warrant, high risk of 
terrorist attack as determined by U.S. 
Homeland Security Secretary, or to 
prevent imminent harm to life or 
serious damage to property, or to 
forestall escape of a suspect or 
destruction of evidence.  No drone 
shall be equipped with any weapon 
of any kind. 
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 S.B. 189 Pending before State 
Government Oversight 
and Reform Committee 
Can use drones in an emergency 
situation as long as there is 
documentation of the emergency and  
a supervisor files a sworn statement 
with the courts within 48 hours of 
beginning of the drone's use.  There 
is evidence of a threat to national 
security or evidence of organized 
crime and a warrant is applied for 
and received within 48 hours of the 
beginning of surveillance.  Use of 
drones must comply with FAA 
regulations. 
Pennsylvania H.B. 961/2158 Referred to Judiciary 
Committee 
H.B. 961Requires a court order in the 
same manner that a wiretap does.  
Must be used to assist in the 
apprehension of a suspect who is 
suspected of a crime which is 
dangerous to life, limb or property, 
and subject to imprisonment for more 
than 1 year. 
 H.B. 2158 Referred to Judiciary 
Committee 
Requires either (1) warrant; (2) use in 
connection with Amber Alert; (3) use 
in connection with a declared 
emergency; (4) for the purpose of 
search or rescue operations; or (5) to 
alleviate imminent threat of death or 
grave injury to person. 
 S.B. 875 Referred to Senate 
committee on State 
Government 
Prevents use of drones prior to July 
2015 unless used during and amber 
alert, state of emergency, or search 
and rescue when necessary to protect 
life, health, or property.  Prohibits 
weaponizing of drones.  Allows for 
the PA National Guard to use drones 
for its training. 





H3415  In Judiciary Committee H3415- Requires warrant or belief of 
a threat of death, bodily harm, escape 
of a suspect, or destruction of 
evidence. 
Vermont H.0540 /S. 0169 In Judiciary Committee Requires warrant or there is a threat 
of death or serious bodily injury 
AND a warrant is obtained within 48 
hours. Drones may not be armed.  
Annual reports must be made by the 
department of safety on drone usage. 
West Virginia H.B. 2732 In House Judiciary 
committee 
No drones may be operated by law 
enforcement in the state except to 
combat terrorism and with a warrant.  
Drones may not carry lethal 
munitions. 
 




TABLE 3: FURTHER STUDY 
 
 
State Bill # Status of Bill Law Enforcement Restrictions 
New 
Hampshire 
H.B. 1620 Referred to interim 
study 
Requires warrant, prior consent, or 
reasonable suspicion that swift action 
is needed to prevent harm to life or 
serious damage. 
Rhode Island H5780/H7170 House Judiciary 
Committee 
recommended bill be 
held pending further 
study 
Requires public hearing prior to any 
agency purchasing a drone.  Requires 
court order or when there is a 
reasonable belief that there is an 
imminent threat to life or physical 
safety and an affidavit is submitted to 
the court within 24 hours describing 
the emergency. 
  S0411/ 2362 Senate Judiciary 
Committee 
recommended bill be 
held pending further 
study 
Requires a warrant. No exceptions. 




TABLE 4: LEGISLATION DEAD 
 
State Bill # Status of Bill Law Enforcement Restrictions 
Arkansas HB 1904 / SB 
1109 
Died in Senate and 
House, held without 
action 
Required use of warrant, threat to 
national security, or evidence of 
organized crime activity.  Contained 
minimalization policies (e.g. facial 
recognition software cannot be run 
on non-target footage.).  Mandated 
Law enforcement to report annually 
on the use of drones. 
Maryland S.B. 926/H.B. 
847 
Died in committee Requires consent, warrant, 
emergency, or grounds on which a 
warrant can be obtained with due 
diligence and application is made 
within 48 hours. 
Minnesota H.F. 1620 Died in committee H.F. Requires warrant, terrorist 
threat, imminent danger to persons or 
property, or prevent escape of 
suspect. Drones may be used by first 
responders. 
Nebraska L.B. 412 Indefinitely postponed Provides that drones may only be 
used when there is a high probability 
of a terrorist attack. 
New Jersey A1039 Referred to Homeland 
Security and State 
Preparedness 
Committee 
Law enforcement must acquire 
warrant or consent, or there must be 
probable cause to believe exigent 
circumstances exist or when locating 
missing persons. 
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Maine L.D. 236 Passed both chambers; 
vetoed by Governor; 
veto sustained 
Would have required either a warrant 
or an emergency situation, with a 
sworn statement being filed with the 
court no later than 48 hours afterward 
explaining emergency.  Had 
information destruction after 48 
hours unless pending investigation or 
trial. 
New Mexico S.B. 556 Dead Required warrant unless there was a 
reasonable belief that there was an 
imminent threat to life. 
North 
Dakota** 
H.B. 1373 Failed in Senate Requires warrant unless used for 
border patrol and within 25 miles of 
international border, there is a 
reasonable belief that there is an 
imminent risk of death or bodily 
harm, or in response to a natural 
disaster.  Drones may not be armed. 
Washington H.B. 1771/S.B. 
6172 
Passed both chambers, 
VETOED by governor 
Requires warrant, warrant expires in 
48 hours.  Also may use if there is an 
immediate threat of death or serious 
bodily harm and a warrant is 
obtained within 48 hours. 
Wyoming H.B. 0242 Died in committee Requires warrant or swift action is 
needed to prevent an imminent 
danger to life, to counter a high risk 
of terrorist attack, investigate a 
felony in progress, to assist in the 
fresh pursuit of a person believed to 
have committed a felony.   
  H.B. 0105 Not considered by the 
Committee as a Whole 
Same as H.B. 0242. 
 




TABLE 5: NO ACTION 
 
State Bill # Status of Bill Law Enforcement Restrictions 
Colorado       
Delaware       
Oklahoma H.B. 1556 There was a bill 
introduced in the house, 
but it failed and the 
legislature seems to 
have removed 
everything except the 
fact it existed at some 
point. 
  
Mississippi       
South Dakota       
 
 
